In re Passmore

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
490 Pa. 391, 416 A.2d 991, 1980 Pa. LEXIS 716 (1980)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

When a donor creates a power of appointment requiring 'specific reference' in the donee's will, the donee effectively exercises that power if their will demonstrates a clear, deliberate intent to exercise any power of appointment granted by the donor, and that power is the only one conferred, especially when other clauses in the donor's instrument indicate the power's conditions should be without restriction or qualification.


Facts:

  • In 1970, Charles F. Passmore (donor) executed a "Revocable Agreement of Trust" establishing an inter vivos trust for his own benefit, as well as the benefit of Laura Passmore (donee) and donee’s sisters, naming National Bank and Trust Company of Central Pennsylvania (Bank) as trustee.
  • The trust provided that upon Charles's death, if survived by Laura, the trust principal would be divided into two new trusts: Trust A (qualifying for the marital deduction) and Trust B (remaining principal).
  • Charles's trust agreement granted Laura a power of appointment over Trust A, stating it "shall be distributed as she may by her will appoint, making specific reference to Trust A under this Revocable Agreement of Trust," but immediately added that the power's conditions "shall be without restriction or qualification of any kind."
  • The trust further stipulated that should Laura fail to effectively exercise this power over Trust A, its principal would be added to Trust B and distributed to specific charities and individuals.
  • Charles F. Passmore died in March 1975.
  • Laura Passmore died twenty-one months later.
  • In her will, Laura stated: "I give, bequeath and devise all of my property... and expressly intend this act to constitute the exercise of any power of appointment which I may possess or enjoy under any Will or trust agreement executed by my husband, Charles F. Passmore..."
  • Laura's will directed that the property subject to the power of appointment be held in trust for her sisters, and upon their deaths, 25% to the Blind Association of Harrisburg and 75% to the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church of Paxtang.
  • Trust A was the only power of appointment Charles F. Passmore had conferred upon Laura.
  • The parties stipulated that it was Laura’s intention, in executing her will, to exercise her power of appointment over Trust A.

Procedural Posture:

  • National Bank and Trust Company of Central Pennsylvania (Bank) filed a Second and Final Account, proposing to disregard Laura Passmore's attempted exercise of her power of appointment over Trust A.
  • The Good Shepherd Lutheran Church of Paxtang and the executor-trustee under Laura Passmore's will (exceptants) filed exceptions, asserting that Laura had validly exercised her power of appointment.
  • The Bank and the exceptants entered into a Stipulation of Facts.
  • The Orphans' Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County dismissed the exceptions, ruling that Laura's exercise was ineffective due to a lack of specific reference to Trust A, citing Schede Estate.
  • Laura's executor-trustee and the Church appealed the orphans' court's decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (the Church's separate appeal was later dismissed upon its joinder with the executor-trustee's appeal).

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Issue:

Does a donee effectively exercise a power of appointment that requires 'specific reference to Trust A under this Revocable Agreement of Trust' if the donee's will refers generally to 'any power of appointment which I may possess or enjoy under any Will or trust agreement executed by my husband, Charles F. Passmore,' when Trust A was the only such power?


Opinions:

Majority - Roberts

Yes, Laura Passmore effectively exercised the power of appointment over Trust A. The court found that this case is distinguishable from Schede Estate because, unlike the donee in Schede, Laura's will explicitly stated her intention to exercise "any power of appointment which I may possess or enjoy under any Will or trust agreement executed by my husband, Charles F. Passmore." Given that Trust A was the only such power her husband had conferred, this constituted a "specific and express reference" that fully complied with the donor's objective. The donor's additional clause that the power's conditions and permissible beneficiaries "shall be without restriction or qualification of any kind" indicated that his true objective was not to impose a literal, verbatim recital, but rather to ensure the donee's deliberate identification and execution of the power. The court reasoned that interpreting the instrument as a whole, attributing to the donor an intention that only a repetition of his verbatim language would satisfy the power would frustrate his broader objectives in creating the power of appointment.


Dissenting - Kauffman

No, Laura Passmore did not effectively exercise the power of appointment. The dissenting opinion asserted that the law has long required "strict and literal compliance" with the terms of a special power of appointment for its valid and effective exercise, citing Schede Estate and other precedents. The donor, Charles, explicitly instructed that the power over Trust A could be exercised only by "making specific reference to Trust A under this Revocable Agreement of Trust." Laura's will failed to make this exact, specific reference to 'Trust A,' thereby failing to comply with her donor's express instructions. Thus, the attempt to exercise the power of appointment was ineffective.


Concurring - Nix

Yes, Laura Passmore effectively exercised the power of appointment. While a strict reading of Schede Estate would likely force the conclusion that the power was not effectively exercised, the concurring opinion agreed with the majority's decision to avoid the rigidity of Schede Estate. It maintained that limitations on the manner of exercising a power of appointment should only be recognized where a legitimate purpose is obtained by insisting upon literal compliance, and such a purpose was not evident in this case.



Analysis:

This case provides a significant clarification in Pennsylvania law regarding the exercise of powers of appointment, shifting from a strictly literal interpretation of conditions to one that prioritizes the donor's overarching intent. It distinguishes the more rigid precedent of Schede Estate by emphasizing a holistic reading of the donor's instrument. The decision allows for a donee's clear, deliberate intent to identify and exercise a power to prevail, even without exact verbatim compliance, especially when the donor's document includes language granting broad discretion. This ruling potentially validates more attempts to exercise powers of appointment where the donee's intent is evident but formalistic adherence is imperfect, thereby preventing the frustration of testamentary objectives.

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