In Re Melton
597 A.2d 892 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An expert psychiatrist is qualified to testify on a patient's potential dangerousness based on their general professional expertise, and their opinion may be based on out-of-court statements and records if such sources are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
Facts:
- Tommie Lee Melton is a man diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, with a history of frequent hospitalizations.
- When unsupervised, Melton often failed to take his prescribed medication, Prolixin, which was essential for managing his condition.
- Without his medication, Melton's health and hygiene severely deteriorated; he suffered from diabetes and glaucoma, lived in filth, and mixed his different medications together in one bottle.
- Several months before the current commitment proceeding, Melton left a hospital against medical advice.
- Upon returning to his mother's home, Melton's mother made several calls to the hospital reporting that he was behaving in a belligerent and disruptive manner.
- Melton's mother reported to hospital staff that he had punched her in the nose, and she feared he would harm her again.
- Based on his mother's calls, hospital staff and police went to the home, where Melton was belligerent and refused to go voluntarily to the hospital.
- Police took Melton into custody and transported him to Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital.
Procedural Posture:
- The District of Columbia initiated civil commitment proceedings against Tommie Lee Melton in the trial court.
- Following a jury trial, Melton was found to be likely to injure himself or others and was ordered committed to Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital for outpatient treatment.
- Melton, as appellant, appealed the commitment order to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
- A divided three-judge panel of the appellate court reversed the trial court's commitment order.
- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals subsequently vacated the panel's opinion and granted a petition for rehearing en banc.
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Issue:
Does the admission of an expert psychiatric opinion, based on out-of-court statements and records not in evidence, violate evidentiary rules when the sources are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, even if the underlying reliability of those specific sources cannot be fully explored through cross-examination of the testifying expert?
Opinions:
Majority - Schwelb, J.
No. The admission of expert psychiatric testimony based on out-of-court statements and records does not violate evidentiary rules as long as the data is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. First, a qualified psychiatrist does not need to demonstrate a separate, specialized expertise in predicting dangerousness to offer an opinion on the matter, as assessing dangerousness is reasonably related to the practice of psychiatry and is contemplated by the District's civil commitment statutes. Second, under the principles of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, an expert's opinion may be based on inadmissible evidence, such as statements from family members and hospital records, because physicians and psychiatrists reasonably and customarily rely on such sources in their professional practice. The court rejected a proposed test that would require the trial judge to find that the reliability of the underlying data could be sufficiently explored through cross-examination, reasoning that such a rule would be an unnecessary intrusion on the expert's sources and that existing safeguards—such as cross-examination of the expert's assumptions and the jury's role in weighing evidence—are adequate.
Dissenting - Ferren, J.
Yes. The admission of the testimony was improper and violated evidentiary rules. First, while experts may rely on hearsay, the court has a duty to ensure that reliance is reasonable by confirming that the underlying data has 'minimum standards of reliability.' This requires a finding that the reliability of the data, especially from potentially biased lay observers like family members, can be sufficiently explored through cross-examination of the expert, a finding the trial court failed to make. Second, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to even consider whether the testifying psychiatrists were actually qualified by training or experience to render an opinion on Melton's dangerousness to others, which is a specialized and controversial area of prediction that not all psychiatrists are equipped to address. The majority improperly engaged in appellate fact-finding to cure the trial court's failure to exercise its discretion.
Analysis:
This decision aligns District of Columbia evidence law with the federal approach under Rule 703, granting expert witnesses significant latitude to base their opinions on the same type of hearsay they would use in their day-to-day professional work. By rejecting a more restrictive test requiring that the hearsay's reliability be verifiable through cross-examination, the court prioritized deference to professional norms over creating a heightened judicial gatekeeping function for expert testimony. This ruling makes it easier to admit psychiatric opinions in civil commitment hearings, placing the burden on the opposing party to challenge the weight and credibility of the opinion through cross-examination rather than precluding its admission entirely.
