In Re Marriage of Pennington
14 P.3d 764 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
For a court to find a 'meretricious relationship' that justifies an equitable division of property, the relationship must be stable and marriage-like, demonstrated by a holistic review of factors including continuous cohabitation, mutual intent, and significant pooling of resources. Sporadic cohabitation, lack of mutual intent, and maintaining separate financial lives weigh against finding such a relationship exists.
Facts:
- In March 1983, Clark Pennington and Evelyn Van Pevenage began a relationship while both were married to other people; Pennington remained married until 1990.
- Pennington and Van Pevenage began living together in August 1985 at Pennington's residence, with him paying the mortgage and her paying for groceries and some furnishings.
- In August 1986, James Nash and Diana Chesterfield began a dating relationship while Chesterfield was married but separated; Nash dated other women during this period.
- The Pennington/Van Pevenage relationship was marked by instability; Van Pevenage moved out in 1991, returned, moved out again from March 1993 to October 1994 (during which both parties dated others), and returned for a final non-sexual year before leaving permanently in October 1995.
- In July 1989, Nash and Chesterfield began living together in a home owned by Chesterfield; they opened a joint checking account for living expenses but otherwise maintained separate finances, careers, and retirement accounts.
- Pennington purchased property and built a home in Yelm solely in his name while still legally married to his wife, though Van Pevenage lived there with him.
- Chesterfield and Nash ceased living together in October 1993, briefly reconciled in 1994 without cohabiting, and permanently ended their relationship in November 1995.
- Both couples disputed the nature of their intent: Pennington denied ever proposing to Van Pevenage, who wanted marriage; Chesterfield refused to invest her funds in Nash's dental practice or a joint house unless they were married.
Procedural Posture:
- Case 1: Van Pevenage filed a complaint for dissolution of a meretricious relationship against Pennington in superior court (trial court).
- The trial court found a meretricious relationship existed and awarded Van Pevenage a judgment of $214,200.
- Pennington (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, holding no meretricious relationship existed.
- Van Pevenage (petitioner) then petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review.
- Case 2: Chesterfield filed a petition for disposition of property against Nash in superior court (trial court).
- The trial court found a meretricious relationship existed and awarded Chesterfield a judgment of $75,594.
- Nash (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision.
- Nash (petitioner) then petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review, which consolidated his case with Pennington's.
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Issue:
Does a meretricious relationship, requiring an equitable division of property, exist where the parties' cohabitation was intermittent, they lacked a mutual intent to be in a marriage-like relationship, and they did not substantially pool their resources for joint projects?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, J.
No, a meretricious relationship does not exist under these circumstances. For a court to equitably divide property upon the termination of a non-marital relationship, the parties must have been in a stable, cohabiting, marriage-like relationship. Applying the five factors from Connell v. Francisco—(1) continuous cohabitation, (2) duration, (3) purpose, (4) pooling of resources, and (5) intent of the parties—neither couple met the threshold. The Pennington/Van Pevenage relationship failed because their cohabitation was sporadic, they had an opposing intent regarding marriage, their finances were not significantly pooled, and the relationship was generally unstable. The Chesterfield/Nash relationship failed because, despite a period of continuous cohabitation, their intent was equivocal, and they maintained separate financial lives, purchasing no significant property jointly and not substantially pooling their time, effort, or financial resources.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and arguably heightens the standard for establishing a meretricious relationship in Washington. The court emphasizes that a long-term relationship with periods of cohabitation is insufficient; there must be strong evidence of stability, mutual intent to live as a married couple, and significant financial integration. The ruling serves as a caution that courts will not use the meretricious relationship doctrine to create a 'de facto common-law marriage,' thereby protecting the distinction between formal marriage and cohabitation. It signals that parties who keep their finances largely separate and do not demonstrate a shared, stable commitment are unlikely to succeed in claims for equitable property division.
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