In Re Marriage of Keech
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8396, 75 Cal.App.4th 860 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When ordering one party in a dissolution action to pay the other party's attorney's fees, a trial court must consider the paying party's ability to pay the ordered installments, the reasonableness and necessity of the fees incurred, and the respective needs of both parties to have access to legal representation.
Facts:
- Richard C. Keech (husband), a physician, and Kristan Keech (wife), a medical bookkeeper with sporadic employment, were married in December 1986 and separated in August 1992.
- The couple had two children, born in 1986 and 1990.
- The husband's gross cash flow available for support was determined to be $5,405 per month.
- The wife's monthly income was determined to be approximately $500.
- The wife asserted she owed her new attorney approximately $31,000, incurred over roughly three months, but did not submit her attorney's bills or a declaration detailing the work performed to substantiate the amount.
- The husband contested the fee request, arguing he could not afford to pay them and that they were unreasonable and excessive, partly due to the wife changing attorneys.
Procedural Posture:
- Kristan Keech (wife) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against Richard C. Keech (husband) in the trial court.
- Several years later, the husband filed an Order to Show Cause (OSC) in the trial court to determine child and spousal support.
- The wife responded to the OSC, requesting an order that the husband pay her attorney's and accountant's fees.
- Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the husband to pay child support, spousal support, and a 'contributive share' of the wife's professional fees in specified monthly installments.
- The husband filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, though it slightly modified the payment schedule for the attorney's fees.
- The husband (appellant) appealed the trial court's order concerning the professional fees to the California Court of Appeal.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion in a dissolution action by ordering one spouse to pay the other's attorney and professional fees without making an inquiry into the paying spouse's ability to make the ordered payments and the reasonableness and necessity of the fees incurred?
Opinions:
Majority - Zebrowski, J.
Yes. A trial court abuses its discretion when it orders one spouse to pay the other's attorney fees without considering the paying spouse's ability to pay the ordered installments and without evaluating whether the fees were reasonably necessary. The trial court's discretion is limited by Family Code sections 2030 and 2032, which mandate consideration of the parties' relative circumstances to ensure each has access to legal representation. Here, the court ordered payments that, after support, taxes, and rent, left the husband with only $93 per month for all other living expenses, which on its face demonstrates a failure to consider his ability to pay. Furthermore, the court awarded $25,000 in attorney's fees based only on the wife's declaration and her counsel's unsworn statement, without any evidence regarding the nature of the work performed or its necessity. A court cannot rely on its own expertise to determine a reasonable fee unless it is first informed of the extent and nature of the services rendered. Awarding fees without this inquiry constitutes an abdication of the judicial function.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the trial court's obligations when awarding pendente lite attorney's fees in dissolution actions. It establishes that a court cannot simply rubber-stamp a fee request based on a disparity in income; there must be a rigorous and documented analysis of the statutory factors. The decision emphasizes that the paying spouse's ability to pay is not an abstract concept but a practical one, requiring an examination of their financial situation after all court-ordered support and necessary living expenses are met. By requiring an inquiry into the reasonableness and necessity of the fees, the case serves as a crucial check on excessive litigation costs and reinforces the principle that fee awards are meant to ensure parity, not to be punitive.
