In Re Marriage of Jones
119 Cal. Rptr. 108, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420 (1975)
Rule of Law:
A servicemember's right to disability pay, acquired before earning a vested right to retirement pay based on longevity, is not a community asset and is therefore the separate property of the disabled spouse upon dissolution of marriage.
Facts:
- Herschel Jones entered military service in 1957.
- Herschel Jones married Sumiko Jones in 1964.
- In 1969, Herschel lost a leg in combat during the Vietnam War, having served for 12 years.
- Due to his permanent disability, Herschel was medically retired from the military.
- Upon his retirement, he began receiving monthly disability pay, as he did not have enough years of service to qualify for longevity retirement pay.
Procedural Posture:
- Sumiko Jones filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against Herschel Jones in the superior court.
- In the dissolution proceeding, Sumiko claimed that Herschel's right to lifetime disability payments was a community asset subject to division.
- The superior court (trial court) ruled that the disability payments Herschel would receive after the dissolution were his separate property.
- Sumiko Jones appealed the superior court's ruling to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does a servicemember's right to disability pay, acquired before he has earned a vested right to longevity retirement pay, constitute a community asset subject to division upon dissolution of the marriage?
Opinions:
Majority - Tobriner, J.
No, a serviceman’s right to disability pay acquired before earning a vested right to retirement pay is not a community asset. Unlike retirement pay, which is deferred compensation for past services rendered during the marriage, military disability pay serves two distinct purposes that are personal to the disabled spouse post-dissolution. First, it compensates for the loss of future earnings and diminished ability to compete in the civilian job market, which is the separate loss of the disabled spouse after the marriage ends. Second, it compensates for the personal pain, suffering, and anguish caused by the disability. The court reasoned that disability pay is analogous to a personal injury award, which under California law (Washington v. Washington and Civ. Code § 5126) is treated as the separate property of the injured spouse if received after marital dissolution. Therefore, payments received after dissolution are properly classified as the disabled spouse's separate property.
Analysis:
This decision established a critical distinction in community property law between retirement benefits and disability benefits by focusing on the purpose of the payment rather than its source. It clarified that while retirement pay is treated as deferred compensation earned during the marriage, disability pay compensates for future lost earnings and personal suffering, which are separate interests after dissolution. This 'purpose-of-the-funds' analysis has since been applied to other employment-related benefits, influencing how courts characterize assets like workers' compensation and private disability insurance in divorce proceedings. The case created a clear rule that benefits meant to replace post-marital earnings or compensate for personal injury are separate property.
