In Re Mariah T.

Majority - Rubin, J.

Yes, Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a) is constitutional, and there was substantial evidence to support the dependency court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders. The court first addresses the mother's contention that section 300, subdivision (a) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define "serious physical harm." The court rejects this argument, holding that the term "serious physical harm" is sufficiently certain and does not violate due process. Citing Williams v. Garcetti, the court notes that the California Supreme Court implicitly suggested that Section 300 provides sufficiently specific guidelines for parental duties of care and protection. The court emphasizes that only reasonable certainty is required for a statute to withstand a vagueness challenge, and statutes are upheld if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to their language, referencing similar statutes or common law. The court draws parallels to cases upholding the phrase "great bodily injury" in criminal statutes (e.g., People v. Maciel, People v. Roberts, People v. Guest), which has been used for over a century without further definition and is understood by "men of common intelligence." It also references James v. U.S., where the U.S. Supreme Court found similar phrases like "serious potential risk of physical injury" not unconstitutionally vague. The court concludes that the term "serious physical harm" is no less specific than "great bodily injury" and can be understood by people of common intelligence. Second, the court finds there was substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings regarding physical and sexual abuse. Regarding physical abuse under subdivision (a), the evidence showed Monique B. used a belt on three-year-old Bryce T., striking him not on the buttocks, but on the stomach and forearms, leaving deep, purple bruises. The court held that Bryce's injuries were serious enough for the court to assume jurisdiction under subdivision (a) in the context of a three-year-old. For the "substantial risk of future serious physical harm" allegations under subdivisions (b) and (j), the court considered mother's repeated use of a belt, her minimization of her actions, denial of Jason's abuse, and threats to Mariah, concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could infer an escalating risk without intervention. Regarding sexual abuse under subdivisions (d) and (j), the court upholds the finding that Jason acted with the requisite sexual intent, which can be inferred from the circumstances (Mariah's testimony about Jason fondling her thigh near her crotch, his signal for silence, her discomfort, and his repetition of the act). This inference is consistent with People v. Mullens. The mother's dismissal of Mariah's claims and her failure to protect the children further supported jurisdiction. Finally, the court affirms the dispositional order placing the children with father. It holds that there was clear and convincing evidence that leaving the children with mother created a substantial danger and that no reasonable means to protect them short of removal existed. Monique B.'s continued denial of Jason's actions and her refusal to have him move out, coupled with her minimization of her own corporal punishment, led the court to reasonably conclude that Jason would remain a risk and that lesser alternatives were insufficient. The court also noted mother waived the issue of whether Jason had left the home at either the jurisdictional or dispositional hearings.