In re Little
30 L. Ed. 2d 708, 92 S. Ct. 659 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
Remarks made by a pro se defendant during summation that are critical of the court do not constitute criminal contempt unless they create an imminent threat to the administration of justice that actually disrupts the court's proceedings.
Facts:
- Petitioner's trial for carrying a concealed weapon was scheduled in the District Court at Winston-Salem.
- Petitioner's retained counsel had another trial engagement, so petitioner filed a written motion for a continuance.
- The trial judge denied the motion, forcing the petitioner to proceed without counsel.
- Petitioner attempted to defend himself pro se.
- During his summation following the close of evidence, petitioner stated that the court was biased, had prejudged the case, and that he was a political prisoner.
Procedural Posture:
- During a trial in the District Court Division of Forsyth County, North Carolina, the trial judge summarily adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court for statements made during summation.
- The judge sentenced the petitioner to 30 days in jail.
- Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court Division.
- The Superior Court denied relief.
- The North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court both denied the petitioner's requests for review.
- The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a pro se defendant's statement during summation, alleging the court is biased and that he is a political prisoner, constitute criminal contempt when the statement is not made in a boisterous tone and does not actually disrupt the court's proceedings?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. In the context of this case, the petitioner's statements in summation did not constitute criminal contempt. Because the court's denial of a continuance forced the petitioner to argue his own cause, he was entitled to as much latitude as counsel vigorously espousing a client's cause. The court found no indication that the statements were made in a boisterous tone or otherwise disrupted the proceedings. Citing Craig v. Harney, the court reasoned that the 'vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt' and that the danger must be an 'imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice.' The contempt power is not for the protection of judges' sensibilities but to prevent obstruction to the administration of justice.
Concurring - Chief Justice Burger
No. While agreeing with the Court's disposition, the opinion notes that contempt holdings are highly dependent on the specific setting, including non-record factors like tone of voice and facial expressions. The author highlights that the state court remains free to initiate new, procedurally proper contempt proceedings against the petitioner for the separate, reprehensible remarks he made while being removed from the courtroom after the initial contempt adjudication.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the high bar required for a summary criminal contempt conviction based on speech directed at a judge. It extends the protections for vigorous advocacy, previously established for attorneys in cases like Holt v. Virginia, to pro se litigants, especially those forced to represent themselves. The ruling reinforces the critical distinction between mere disrespect, which judges are expected to endure, and actual, imminent obstruction of justice, which is the sole justification for the contempt power. It curtails the use of contempt as a tool for judges to punish personal criticism.
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