In re Lee
2013 WL 5494094, 411 S.W.3d 445, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1247 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Under Texas Family Code § 153.0071(e), a trial court must enter judgment on a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that meets the statutory requirements and cannot refuse to do so based on a judicial determination of the child's best interest, unless the narrow statutory exception for family violence applies.
Facts:
- Stephanie Lee and Benjamin Redus are the parents of a minor daughter and were joint managing conservators under a 2007 order.
- Stephanie Lee had the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence.
- Stephanie was married to Scott Lee, a registered sex offender, and had previously allowed him to have contact with the child in violation of his probation conditions.
- Stephanie relinquished primary care and possession of the child to Benjamin for a period of at least six months.
- The parties attended mediation with their attorneys to modify the 2007 order.
- In mediation, they executed a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) giving Benjamin the exclusive right to establish the child's primary residence.
- The MSA granted Stephanie periodic possession of the child but included a provision that Scott Lee was to be enjoined from being within 5 miles of the child at all times during her possession periods.
- The MSA contained a prominently displayed, capitalized, and underlined statement that the agreement was binding and not subject to revocation, and it was signed by both parties and their attorneys.
Procedural Posture:
- Benjamin Redus filed a petition in the district court to modify a prior order affecting the parent-child relationship.
- After the parties executed an MSA, Benjamin presented it to an associate judge, who refused to enter judgment on the agreement.
- Stephanie Lee filed a motion in the district court to enter judgment on the MSA.
- The district court denied Stephanie's motion, finding the MSA was not in the child's best interest, and set the case for trial.
- Stephanie Lee, as relator, petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, which was denied.
- Stephanie Lee then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to enter judgment on the MSA.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to enter judgment on a statutorily compliant mediated settlement agreement (MSA) in a child custody suit based on a determination that the MSA is not in the child's best interest?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Lehrmann
Yes. A trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to enter judgment on a statutorily compliant MSA based on a determination that the agreement is not in the child's best interest. The plain language of Texas Family Code § 153.0071(e) unambiguously states that a party is 'entitled to judgment' on a compliant MSA 'notwithstanding ... another rule of law.' The legislature provided only one narrow exception in subsection (e-1) for cases involving family violence where the agreement is also not in the child's best interest. The existence of this specific exception demonstrates the legislative intent to foreclose a broader best-interest inquiry in all other circumstances. This is further evidenced by the contrasting provision for arbitration awards, which explicitly allows for a best-interest review. The more specific and later-enacted MSA statute prevails over the general policy that a child's best interest is the primary consideration. While courts must protect children from endangerment, they must do so using other statutory tools, such as reporting abuse or issuing protective orders, not by refusing to enforce a valid MSA.
Dissenting - Justice Green
No. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to enter judgment on an MSA that it determines could endanger a child's safety and is therefore not in the child's best interest. The Family Code's overarching policy, stated in § 153.002, is that the 'best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration' of the court. Forcing a court to enter judgment on an agreement that endangers a child leads to an absurd result and negates the court's fundamental duty. The 'notwithstanding another rule of law' language should be interpreted narrowly to overcome procedural objections to enforcement, not to override the substantive, paramount policy of protecting children. In this case, the mother's history of poor judgment regarding her sex-offender husband rebutted the presumption that the parents were acting in the child's best interest, justifying the trial court's refusal to approve the MSA and its decision to hold a full evidentiary hearing.
Concurring - Justice Guzman
Yes. The trial court abused its discretion in this specific case. While a broad best-interest inquiry is precluded, a trial court retains discretion to refuse to enter judgment on an MSA if presented with evidence that doing so would endanger the child. However, in this case, the record from the de novo hearing before the district court contained legally insufficient evidence of endangerment to justify setting aside the MSA. The most inflammatory allegation was not repeated, and other key testimony was excluded as hearsay. Without sufficient evidence that the mother would violate the MSA's protective provisions, thereby endangering the child, the trial court had no basis to refuse to enter judgment.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the finality and enforceability of Mediated Settlement Agreements in Texas family law. It establishes that courts must defer to the parents' collaborative decisions about their children's best interests, drastically limiting a trial judge's discretion to substitute their own judgment for that of the parents. The ruling clarifies that a court's duty to protect a child from endangerment must be exercised through other statutory avenues, such as involving child protective services or issuing separate protective orders, rather than by invalidating a validly executed MSA. This holding promotes the policy of alternative dispute resolution by assuring parties that their mediated agreements will be binding, but it also raises the procedural complexity for trial courts concerned about a child's safety under the terms of an MSA.
