In re L.M.
286 Kan. 460, 186 P.3d 164 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Juveniles in Kansas have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and §§ 5 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, because legislative changes have transformed the state's juvenile justice system from a rehabilitative parens patriae model into one akin to an adult criminal prosecution.
Facts:
- Sixteen-year-old L.M. was charged as a juvenile offender with one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of minor in possession of alcohol.
- The charges stemmed from a sexually suggestive confrontation between L.M. and a neighbor who was walking home.
Procedural Posture:
- L.M. was charged as a juvenile offender in district court on one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of minor in possession of alcohol.
- L.M. requested a jury trial in district court, which was denied.
- After a trial to the bench (without a jury), the district court found L.M. guilty as charged.
- The district court sentenced L.M. as a Serious Offender I to 18 months in a juvenile correctional facility, but stayed his sentence and ordered probation until age 20, along with sex offender treatment and registration.
- L.M. appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals (as appellant), claiming a constitutional right to a jury trial, that his statements to police should have been suppressed, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
- L.M. filed a petition for review with the Kansas Supreme Court on the sole issue of whether he had a constitutional right to a jury trial in a juvenile offender proceeding. The Kansas Supreme Court granted L.M.'s petition for review.
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Issue:
Does the Revised Kansas Juvenile Justice Code's shift in purpose, terminology, sentencing structure, and confidentiality provisions mean that juveniles in Kansas now have a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile offender proceedings under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and §§ 5 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Rosen, J.
Yes, juveniles in Kansas have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, because recent legislative changes to the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code (KJJC) have transformed its character to resemble an adult criminal prosecution. The court noted that prior precedent in Findlay v. State (1984), relying on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), held that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial due to the rehabilitative and parens patriae (state as parent) nature of the juvenile system. However, the court found this reasoning no longer binding because the KJJC's primary goals have shifted to public safety and offender accountability, aligning with adult criminal sentencing. The KJJC now uses criminal terminology (e.g., 'plead guilty/not guilty,' 'sentencing proceeding,' 'juvenile correctional facility,' 'term of incarceration') and emulates the structure of adult sentencing guidelines, including a sentencing matrix, departure provisions, after-care, and good time credits. Furthermore, many protective and confidential provisions of the old juvenile code have been removed, making juvenile hearings and records more public. This erosion of the benevolent parens patriae character means juvenile proceedings now function like 'criminal prosecutions,' triggering the federal constitutional right to a jury trial. Similarly, the court found KJJC proceedings fit the 'all prosecutions' language of § 10 of the Kansas Constitution. Consequently, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2344(d) and K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 38-2357, which allow for a trial to the court or discretionary jury trial, are unconstitutional. The court reversed L.M.'s adjudication and remanded for a new jury trial, applying the decision to cases pending on direct review or not yet final.
Dissenting - McFarland, C.J.
No, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in juvenile offender proceedings. Chief Justice McFarland respectfully disagreed with the majority, arguing that while some legislative changes have made the juvenile system more punitive and incorporated adult criminal terminology and mechanisms, the majority overstated and overemphasized these changes. She contended that the protective, rehabilitative, and child-cognizant characteristics that distinguish the juvenile system from the adult criminal system remain largely intact. The dissent highlighted that the basic goals of public protection and rehabilitating juvenile offenders still exist and are not incompatible. Significant differences persist, such as less severe sentences for juveniles, discretionary commitment to correctional facilities, and a unique power for juvenile judges to modify sentences. The dissent pointed to distinctive juvenile system features like pre-charge intake and intervention programs, a statutory preference for maintaining the family unit, permanency planning, the appointment of Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA), local citizen review boards, and required parental involvement, all of which underscore the system's continued rehabilitative and protective character. The dissent also argued that changes to confidentiality provisions were not as sweeping as portrayed and that the juvenile system continues to carefully balance public protection with rehabilitation. Therefore, the rationale underlying McKeiver and Findlay remains valid, and the majority's decision runs contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions that have rejected similar arguments.
Concurring - Luckert, J.
Yes, L.M. has a constitutional right to a jury trial, but this conclusion is based on § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, rather than solely on the Sixth Amendment or § 10 of the Kansas Constitution. Justice Luckert acknowledged that for a 'discrete population' of juvenile offenders—specifically those with serious adjudicatory histories or charged with serious offenses (like L.M., who fell under K.S.A. 38-2331(b) exceptions for direct secure facility placement)—the KJJC's procedural and substantive provisions do not materially differ from adult prosecution, making the denial of a jury trial constitutionally unjustified on due process grounds. However, the primary basis for the concurrence's decision was a historical analysis of § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, which states the right to jury trial shall be 'inviolate.' Reviewing English common law from the period when the Kansas Constitution was adopted (1859-1861), Justice Luckert found that juveniles 14 years or older charged with felonies were historically tried as adults and unequivocally enjoyed the right to a jury trial. Thus, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights grants a right to a jury trial to all juveniles 14 years of age or older who are charged with a felony, thereby entitling 16-year-old L.M., charged with aggravated sexual battery, to a jury trial.
Analysis:
This case represents a landmark shift in juvenile justice jurisprudence in Kansas, fundamentally altering the landscape for juveniles accused of crimes. By overturning prior precedent and declaring a constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles, the Kansas Supreme Court moved the state's juvenile system closer to procedural parity with the adult criminal system. The decision signals that when legislative reforms make a juvenile code functionally equivalent to an adult criminal code in its punitive and adversarial aspects, traditional parens patriae distinctions no longer justify withholding fundamental due process rights like a jury trial. This ruling will likely necessitate significant procedural changes in Kansas juvenile courts, particularly for serious offenses, and could serve as influential precedent for other states whose juvenile systems have undergone similar transformations.
