In re Kiley
947 N.E.2d 1, 459 Mass. 645 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
When a client enters into a representation agreement with a law firm, the firm as an entity is obligated to the client. A court may compel the firm to continue representation by assigning another attorney if the original attorney withdraws, but the court may not specify which particular attorney from the firm must take over the case.
Facts:
- Michael A. McGibbon entered into a contingent fee agreement with the law firm of Thomas M. Kiley & Associates, LLP (Kiley firm) for a medical malpractice claim.
- The agreement was signed by Thomas M. Kiley.
- Pamela A. Swift, an attorney at the Kiley firm, filed the lawsuit and represented McGibbon.
- Swift later informed McGibbon that she was taking a sabbatical from the practice of law and would be leaving the Kiley firm.
- Swift advised McGibbon that he would need to seek successor counsel.
- McGibbon attempted to find new counsel but was unsuccessful.
- McGibbon expressed his desire for the Kiley firm to continue representing him.
- After Swift's departure, Kiley sent a letter to McGibbon stating that the firm was unilaterally terminating their representation agreement.
Procedural Posture:
- Pamela Swift, an attorney with the Kiley firm, filed a medical malpractice suit on behalf of Michael McGibbon in the Superior Court.
- Swift filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record.
- The Superior Court judge initially denied the motion without prejudice.
- Upon Swift's motion for reconsideration, the judge allowed her to withdraw but ordered Thomas Kiley, the firm's named partner, to enter an appearance for McGibbon.
- Kiley filed a motion to vacate or reconsider the order, which the judge denied.
- Kiley petitioned a single justice of the Appeals Court for interlocutory relief, which was denied.
- Kiley then filed a petition for interlocutory relief with a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, who reserved and reported the case to the full court for a decision.
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Issue:
Does a court abuse its discretion by ordering a specific named partner of a law firm to enter an appearance for a client after the original attorney withdraws, where the client has a contingent fee agreement with the firm and cannot find successor counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Gants, J.
Yes. A court abuses its discretion when it orders a specific attorney within a law firm to enter an appearance, although it does not abuse its discretion by requiring the firm itself to continue the representation. The representation agreement was with the Kiley firm as a whole, not with Kiley or Swift as individuals. Therefore, the firm's obligations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 persist even after the departure of the handling attorney. Because McGibbon could not find new counsel, the firm's withdrawal would have a material adverse effect on his interests, which is prohibited without a valid reason under the rule. The firm's belated recognition that the case might not be profitable is not a valid reason for withdrawal. While the judge correctly required the firm to continue its representation to prevent prejudice to the client and delays to the court, the selection of which attorney handles the case is an internal management decision for the firm, and the court overstepped by ordering Kiley specifically to take the case.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the attorney-client relationship formed with a law firm binds the entire entity, not just the individual lawyer assigned to the case. It establishes a precedent that prevents firms from easily abandoning clients, particularly in contingency fee cases, merely because the original attorney leaves or the case appears less profitable than anticipated. The ruling balances the court's power to protect clients and manage its docket with a respect for a law firm's internal governance. Future cases will likely use this standard to hold firms accountable for their client commitments while affirming that courts cannot micromanage a firm's internal staffing decisions.
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