In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD)
189 Conn. 276, 38 A.L.R. 4th 736, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-129(b), which permits temporary removal of children from parental custody, is constitutional when read in conjunction with § 17-38a(e), which requires a showing of serious physical illness, serious physical injury, or immediate physical danger to the child. In such temporary custody proceedings, the state bears the burden of proof, and the standard of proof required by due process is a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Facts:
- The defendant and her six children resided in a small apartment in New Haven and had been receiving protective services from the Department of Children and Youth Services (DCYS) since 1976.
- A DCYS caseworker, Michelle Spicknall, visited the defendant's home 27 times over nine months in 1979, considering the family situation "marginal" but noting the children were "not abused [or] neglected" and shared a "very warm" relationship with their mother.
- During the night of September 4-5, 1979, the defendant's youngest child, nine-month-old Christopher, died and was pronounced dead after unsuccessful resuscitation at Yale-New Haven Medical Center, where his pediatrician noted some unexplained superficial marks.
- At the time of the temporary custody hearing, preliminary autopsy findings indicated no internal injuries, and Christopher's pediatrician testified that the external marks were not the cause of death and the child had had a viral lung infection; the exact cause of death remained undetermined.
- Allegations made against the defendant included a dirty apartment with roaches, beer cans, the defendant observed drinking beer, and a report by a neighbor (later denied by the neighbor) that the children had once been left alone all night.
- Sometime after the initial temporary custody orders were granted, the state received a final autopsy report for Christopher, which effectively exonerated the defendant from any wrongdoing in his death, finding no connection between his death and neglect or abuse.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 5, 1979, the plaintiff Commissioner of Children and Youth Services seized custody of the defendant's five remaining children under the "96-hour hold" provision of General Statutes § 17-38a(e).
- On September 7, 1979, DCYS filed petitions of neglect under General Statutes § 46b-129(a) for each of the defendant's children in the Juvenile Court for New Haven.
- Accompanying each petition was an affidavit for orders of temporary custody, asking the court to issue temporary ex parte orders to keep the five children in DCYS custody under authority of § 46b-129(b)(2).
- On September 7, 1979, the Juvenile Court for New Haven granted, ex parte, temporary custody to the commissioner based on the allegations, pending a noticed hearing on temporary custody set for September 14, 1979.
- At the September 14 temporary custody hearing, after taking testimony, the Juvenile Court found "probable cause" and ordered temporary custody of the children to remain with the plaintiff commissioner.
- Additional testimony was taken for the temporary custody order on October 5 and October 23, 1979, after which the Juvenile Court "affirmed" its earlier temporary custody order and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the petitions and the order of temporary custody.
- The defendant appealed the order of temporary custody to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
1. Is Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-129(b), allowing for temporary custody orders, unconstitutional as an impermissible infringement on the right to family integrity or for being unconstitutionally vague? 2. What is the correct standard and burden of proof for a temporary custody proceeding under General Statutes § 46b-129(b)?
Opinions:
Majority - Speziale, C. J.
1. Yes, General Statutes § 46b-129(b) is constitutional because it must be read together with § 17-38a(e), which contains adequate criteria for determining whether temporary custody of children may be taken from a parent by court order. The court emphasized the constitutional importance of family integrity, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and affirmed that state intervention in family matters is justified only by a compelling state interest in protecting minor children who are "at risk of harm." This compelling interest is narrowly defined by § 17-38a(e), permitting summary seizure only if there is probable cause to believe the child is suffering from "serious physical illness or serious physical injury or is in immediate physical danger from his surroundings, and that immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to insure the child’s safety." The court clarified that although § 46b-129(b) uses broader language, related statutes must be read as a whole to render a reasonable overall interpretation; therefore, the restrictive criteria of § 17-38a(e) must be applied to intervention under § 46b-129(b) to ensure constitutionality. In this case, the court found no substantial showing that the defendant’s five children were in immediate physical danger based on the evidence presented, particularly after the pediatrician testified that the marks on Christopher’s body were not related to his death, and the final autopsy report exonerated the mother. The DCYS had a continuing duty to reunite the family once the reason for custody ceased to exist. 2. No, the trial court erred when it determined that "probable cause" is the standard of proof in a temporary custody proceeding. The correct standard of proof is a fair preponderance of the evidence, and the burden of proof always rests with the state. The court reasoned that where a fundamental right, such as family integrity, is involved, the burden of proof is always on the party seeking to interfere with that right (the state). The trial court's conclusion that the children were "presumptively neglected" impermissibly shifted this burden. For the standard of proof, the court distinguished temporary custody hearings from permanent termination of parental rights hearings (which require "clear and convincing evidence" under Santosky v. Kramer). The fair preponderance standard is appropriate for temporary custody because: (1) the nature of the private interests involved differs, as temporary custody hearings balance both the child's safety and the combined family integrity interests of the parent and child (which are in relative equipoise), whereas termination proceedings primarily pit the state against the parent's family integrity; and (2) the deprivation of rights in a temporary custody adjudication is neither final nor irrevocable, as these orders are temporary and subject to review.
Concurring - Shea, J.
1. Yes, General Statutes § 46b-129(b) is constitutional, but it does not need to be read together with § 17-38a(e). I agree with the result and with the essential holding that the proper standard for temporary orders of custody is a preponderance of the evidence. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that § 46b-129(b) must be read in conjunction with § 17-38a(e) to be constitutional. Section 46b-129(b) itself contains a constitutionally sufficient standard: "that the child’s or youth’s condition or the circumstances surrounding his care require that his custody be immediately assumed to safeguard his welfare." This standard is broad enough to encompass situations beyond just physical danger, such as serious emotional damage or exploitation, which also warrant immediate state intervention. The legislative history does not suggest an intent to narrow the scope of § 46b-129(b) by reading it into § 17-38a, which was enacted later. 2. Yes, I agree with the majority that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof ("probable cause") and that the proper standard for temporary orders of custody under General Statutes § 46b-129(b) is a preponderance of the evidence.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the due process requirements for state intervention in family matters in Connecticut, reinforcing the fundamental constitutional right to family integrity. By mandating that temporary custody orders under § 46b-129(b) must meet the stringent "serious physical illness or injury or immediate physical danger" criteria of § 17-38a(e), the court established a high bar for state removal, even if temporary. The decision also definitively places the burden of proof on the state and sets the standard at a fair preponderance of the evidence, striking a balance between protecting children from harm and safeguarding parental rights, while distinguishing temporary custody from permanent termination proceedings where a higher standard is required.
