In Re Jefferson
283 Ga. 216, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney may be held in criminal contempt for statements made during courtroom proceedings only if the statements posed an imminent threat to the administration of justice and the attorney knew or should have known the conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy.
Facts:
- Attorney Sherri Jefferson represented a minor client, B.W., in a delinquency proceeding in Glynn County Juvenile Court.
- B.W. was accused of being a party to aggravated battery for allegedly supplying a weapon and encouraging the primary actor in a shooting.
- During an August 9, 2005 hearing, Jefferson repeatedly challenged the trial court's evidentiary rulings which sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objections.
- Jefferson's line of questioning sought to introduce the contents of statements the alleged shooter had made to the police.
- Throughout the proceedings, Jefferson engaged in conduct, including making certain statements, using a specific tone of voice, and exhibiting facial expressions, that the trial judge later cited as contemptuous.
Procedural Posture:
- The Glynn County Juvenile Court adjudicated Sherri Jefferson's client delinquent.
- Subsequently, the trial judge issued a Notice of Contempt against Jefferson and then recused himself.
- A new judge was designated and, after a hearing, found Jefferson in criminal contempt for two statements, sentencing her to 30 days imprisonment and a $500 fine.
- Jefferson, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
- The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, affirmed the contempt adjudication.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does holding an attorney in criminal contempt for courtroom statements require a finding that the conduct posed an imminent threat to the administration of justice and that the attorney knew or should have known the conduct exceeded the bounds of permissible advocacy?
Opinions:
Majority - Presiding Justice Hunstein
Yes. An attorney may be held in contempt for statements made during courtroom proceedings only after a court finds both that the conduct posed an imminent threat to the administration of justice and that the attorney knew or should have known it exceeded the bounds of permissible advocacy. The previous "clear and present danger" standard is inadequate because it leads to inconsistent results and fails to sufficiently account for the represented party's rights to counsel and due process. To establish contempt, which is a crime, the court must find two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: an actus reus (a wrongful act) and a mens rea (a culpable mental state). The actus reus is satisfied by conduct that poses an 'imminent threat' of interfering with the administration of justice. The mens rea is satisfied by an objective standard: whether the attorney 'knows or reasonably should be aware... that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his proper role.' This new standard protects zealous advocacy, which is essential to the truth-seeking process, while empowering courts to address genuinely obstructive conduct. Doubts should be resolved in favor of vigorous advocacy.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a new, more stringent, and uniform standard for adjudicating attorney contempt in Georgia, replacing the vague 'clear and present danger' test. By creating a specific two-part test requiring both an obstructive act and a culpable mental state (judged objectively), the court provides greater protection for zealous advocacy. This will likely make it more difficult for trial courts to hold attorneys in contempt for passionate or persistent argumentation that does not truly threaten the judicial process. The ruling forces judges to distinguish between conduct that is merely offensive to their sensibilities and conduct that genuinely obstructs the administration of justice, thereby clarifying the line between permissible advocacy and punishable contempt.
