In re Grand Jury
103 F.3d 1140 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, federal courts do not recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege. The creation of such a privilege, which would allow a parent or child to refuse to testify against the other about confidential communications, is a matter for Congress to decide, not the judiciary.
Facts:
- In the Virgin Islands case, a federal grand jury began investigating a son for 'certain transactions' he was allegedly involved in at age eighteen.
- The grand jury subpoenaed the son's father, a former FBI agent with whom the son had a very close relationship, to testify.
- The father believed the grand jury intended to question him about confidential conversations he had with his son.
- In a separate case in Delaware, a federal grand jury investigated a father's alleged participation in an interstate kidnapping.
- The grand jury subpoenaed the father's sixteen-year-old minor daughter to testify as part of the investigation.
Procedural Posture:
- In the Virgin Islands case, the father filed a motion to quash the grand jury subpoena in the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands.
- The targeted son successfully moved to intervene in the proceeding.
- The district court denied the motion to quash but stayed its order pending appeal.
- The son, as intervenor, appealed the district court's denial of the motion to quash to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- In the Delaware case, the daughter, mother, and father filed a joint motion to quash the subpoena in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.
- The district court denied the motion to quash.
- The daughter appeared before the grand jury but refused to testify, and the district court held her in civil contempt, staying sanctions pending appeal.
- The daughter, mother, and father appealed the district court's denial of the motion to quash to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 501 permit the recognition of a parent-child testimonial privilege that would prevent a grand jury from compelling a parent or child to testify against the other?
Opinions:
Majority - Garth
No, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not permit the judicial recognition of a parent-child testimonial privilege. The court reasoned that evidentiary privileges are generally disfavored because they obstruct the truth-seeking function of the courts, and the public has a right to every person's evidence. The court found that unlike the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee v. Redmond, a parent-child privilege has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts and was not one of the privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence. Applying the four-factor Wigmore test, the court determined that confidentiality is not essential to the parent-child relationship in the way it is for professional relationships, and the potential harm to the relationship from compelled testimony does not outweigh the significant benefit of obtaining all relevant evidence for the correct disposal of litigation. Finally, the court concluded that creating a new privilege with its complex policy considerations and defining its scope is a task better suited for the legislative branch, not the judiciary.
Concurring / dissenting - Mansmann
Yes, in the Virgin Islands case, the court should recognize a limited parent-child privilege. This dissent argues that the public good of protecting strong, trusting parent-child relationships outweighs the government's interest in compelling parental testimony, especially concerning confidential communications from a child seeking parental guidance. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 grants courts the flexibility to develop privileges on a case-by-case basis. The proposed privilege would be narrow, applying only when a child makes confidential communications to a parent while seeking advice, and would be jointly held by both. This situation is more compelling than cases where a child is asked to testify against a parent, as in the Delaware case. The dissent analogizes to the spousal privilege, asserting that the same fundamental interest in preserving family harmony applies and that forcing a parent to incriminate their child is contrary to societal values.
Analysis:
This decision firmly aligns the Third Circuit with every other federal circuit to have considered the issue, establishing a uniform federal rejection of the parent-child testimonial privilege. The court's reasoning emphasizes a strict construction of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and a strong deference to Congress on matters of public policy, contrasting with the Supreme Court's more flexible approach in Jaffee v. Redmond. By finding the Wigmore test is not met, the court signals that any judicially created privilege must be absolutely essential to a relationship, a high bar that the parent-child bond does not clear. This ruling solidifies the principle that absent legislative action, family relationships do not provide a basis to refuse to give evidence in federal criminal proceedings.
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