In re Gault et al.
387 U.S. 1 (1967)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Juvenile delinquency proceedings that may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed must provide the juvenile with the fundamental procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- Gerald Gault, a 15-year-old, was on six months' probation for being in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet.
- On June 8, 1964, a neighbor, Mrs. Cook, verbally complained to police that she had received a lewd and indecent telephone call.
- That same day, the Sheriff took Gerald Gault and his friend, Ronald Lewis, into custody without leaving notice at the Gaults' home, as both of his parents were at work.
- Gerald's mother learned of her son's detention later that evening and was orally informed by a probation officer, Mr. Flagg, that a hearing would be held the next day.
- At a hearing on June 9 in the judge's chambers, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present, no one was sworn under oath, and no transcript was made. There was conflicting testimony about whether Gerald admitted to making the lewd remarks.
- After being detained for several days, Gerald was released, and his mother received an informal note informing them of a 'further hearing' on June 15.
- At the June 15 hearing, Mrs. Cook was again absent, despite Mrs. Gault’s request for her to be present. The judge relied on a probation officer's 'referral report' which was not disclosed to the Gaults.
- The judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School for a maximum of six years, until he turned 21. An adult convicted of the same offense would face a maximum penalty of a $50 fine and two months in jail.
Procedural Posture:
- The Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona, adjudged Gerald Gault a delinquent and committed him to the State Industrial School.
- Gault's parents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Arizona.
- The state supreme court referred the petition to the Superior Court of Arizona for a hearing.
- The Superior Court, a trial-level court, conducted a hearing and then dismissed the writ of habeas corpus.
- Gault's parents, as appellants, appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Arizona, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the writ.
- Gault's parents appealed the decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Do juvenile delinquency proceedings that could result in commitment to a state institution require the application of certain procedural due process protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the rights to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Fortas
Yes. Adjudicatory hearings for juvenile delinquency that may lead to institutional commitment must comport with the essentials of due process and fair treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the long-standing concept of 'parens patriae' (the state acting as a parent) cannot serve as a justification for denying juveniles fundamental constitutional rights. The reality of commitment to a state industrial school is a significant deprivation of liberty, functionally equivalent to imprisonment for an adult. Therefore, due process for juveniles requires: (1) timely, written notice of the specific charges; (2) notification of the right to retained or appointed counsel; (3) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, absent a valid confession; and (4) the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court concluded that 'the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.'
Concurring - Justice Black
Yes. The specific guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination, apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and must be afforded in juvenile proceedings. When a person, regardless of age, faces years of confinement for violating a criminal law, they are entitled to the full protections of the Bill of Rights. To deny these protections to a juvenile while granting them to an adult facing lesser punishment would be a plain denial of equal protection. These rights apply not because of a vague notion of 'fundamental fairness' but because they are explicitly granted by the Constitution.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes. Justice White joined the Court's opinion but would not have reached the issues of self-incrimination, confrontation, or cross-examination. He argued that the failure to provide adequate notice and the right to counsel were sufficient grounds to reverse the judgment. He believed the record was inadequate to determine whether Gerald Gault's Fifth Amendment privilege was violated and noted that because the adjudication predated Miranda v. Arizona, it was a poor case for applying that precedent's principles.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Harlan
Yes, in part. Justice Harlan agreed that due process requires juveniles to be afforded (1) timely notice, (2) the right to counsel, and (3) a written record adequate for review. However, he dissented from the majority's decision to impose the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. He argued that these requirements, taken directly from the adversarial criminal system, would radically alter the character of juvenile proceedings and frustrate their rehabilitative purpose. He advocated for a more cautious 'fundamental fairness' approach that would preserve the unique, non-adversarial nature of the juvenile court system.
Dissenting - Justice Stewart
No. The Court's decision is unsound and unwise, as it serves to convert a non-adversarial juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution. Juvenile courts are designed for correction and rehabilitation, not conviction and punishment, and their mission is the opposite of a criminal court. Imposing the inflexible restrictions of a criminal trial is a 'long step backwards' that undermines the unique and enlightened purpose of the juvenile justice system. Due process does not require that juvenile hearings be framed with the technical niceties of a criminal trial.
Analysis:
In re Gault is a landmark decision that fundamentally reshaped the American juvenile justice system. By rejecting the traditional parens patriae doctrine as a shield for procedural arbitrariness, the Court established that juveniles are 'persons' under the Constitution entitled to due process rights. This ruling constitutionalized the juvenile delinquency adjudication process, shifting it from an informal, discretionary system toward a more formal, adversarial model resembling adult criminal courts. The case set a constitutional floor for procedural fairness in juvenile cases, requiring states to provide notice, counsel, and other protections, thereby significantly enhancing the legal rights of minors facing potential loss of liberty.
Unlock the full brief for In re Gault et al.