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In Re Estate of Zucker

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
761 A.2d 148 (2000)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A remainder interest is presumed to vest at the time of the testator's death unless the will's language plainly, manifestly, and indisputably indicates an intent to create a contingent interest. Language of survivorship, such as 'or to the survivor of them,' is presumed to refer to surviving the testator, not the life tenant, absent a clear contrary intent.


Facts:

  • Henry P. Zucker executed a will creating a trust for his daughter, Pauline N. Riddle, for the duration of her life.
  • The will specified that upon Riddle's death, the remaining trust assets would be divided, with one-half going to the Lutheran Home and one-half to 'GEORGE T. FOREMAN and ETHEL C. FOREMAN, his wife, in equal shares, or to the survivor of them.'
  • The testator, Henry P. Zucker, died on June 21, 1983.
  • Both George T. Foreman and Ethel C. Foreman died after the testator, Zucker, but before the life tenant, Riddle.
  • The life tenant, Pauline N. Riddle, died on December 16, 1995.
  • George T. Foreman, Jr., is the surviving son and heir of George and Ethel Foreman.

Procedural Posture:

  • The trustee for Henry P. Zucker's estate submitted an account for audit before the Orphans’ Court of the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, the court of first instance.
  • The Orphans' Court adjudicated the matter, granting the entire residuary estate to the Lutheran Home.
  • George T. Foreman, Jr. filed exceptions to the adjudication.
  • An en banc panel of the Orphans’ Court denied the exceptions and confirmed its prior adjudication.
  • George T. Foreman, Jr., as appellant, filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court, against the Lutheran Home, the appellee.

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Issue:

Does a bequest to remaindermen 'or to the survivor of them,' which is to be paid after the death of a life tenant, create a vested interest at the time of the testator's death or a contingent interest that requires the remaindermen to survive the life tenant?


Opinions:

Majority - Beck, J.

Yes, it creates a vested interest at the testator's death. The interest of the remaindermen vests at the death of the testator unless the will expresses a clear and indisputable intent to make it contingent upon surviving the life tenant. The law strongly presumes that interests are vested. The court reasoned that the words 'survivor' or 'surviving' following a prior gift are understood to refer to the death of the testator, not the life tenant, unless a contrary intention is plainly shown. Here, the will's structure separates the gift to the Lutheran Home from the gift to the Foremans. The survivorship language applies only between the Foremans, dictating how their one-half share is to be distributed between them, not as a condition for their share vesting relative to the life tenant's death. The court cites precedents like Bald Estate and distinguishes cases like Loving Estate and Deacon Estate based on different will language and structure.


Dissenting - Cirillo, President Judge Emeritus

No, it creates a contingent interest that requires surviving the life tenant. The plain language of the will, which is the best indicator of the testator's intent, attached several conditions to the Foremans' gift, including the requirement of survivorship. The dissent argues that the canons of construction should not be used because the will is not ambiguous. The testator's intent was to benefit living persons—his daughter primarily, and then the named remaindermen—not the estates of deceased individuals. Since the testator did not name the Foremans' son, there was no intent to benefit him. Because both George and Ethel Foreman predeceased the life tenant, their gift lapsed according to its own terms.



Analysis:

This decision reinforces the strong legal presumption in favor of the early vesting of estates in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. It clarifies that generic survivorship language is generally interpreted to mean surviving the testator, thereby preventing the divestment of a remainder interest if the remainderman predeceases the life tenant. The court's focus on the will's grammatical structure, separating the beneficiaries into distinct clauses, provides a clear guide for future cases on how to interpret survivorship language that might otherwise seem ambiguous. This ruling solidifies precedent that courts will favor interpretations that create vested interests to avoid forfeiture, especially when a testator's contrary intent is not explicitly and unmistakably clear.

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