In Re Estate of Kissinger
206 P.3d 665 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal acquittal by reason of insanity does not preclude a civil court from finding that a killing was 'wilful and unlawful' under a slayer statute. For purposes of such a statute, a killing is 'unlawful' even if the killer is not criminally culpable, and 'wilful' means the act was done intentionally and designedly.
Facts:
- Joshua Hoge had a long history of severe mental illness, including schizophrenia and Capgras syndrome, which caused him to believe his mother and stepbrother were imposters.
- Hoge had previously threatened to kill his mother, Pamela Kissinger.
- On June 23, 1999, while he was not taking his antipsychotic medication, Hoge entered his mother's home.
- Hoge stabbed and killed his mother, Pamela Kissinger, and his stepbrother, James Zachary Kissinger.
- Hoge also attempted to kill his mother's boyfriend, Walter Williams, with an ax.
- When apprehended, Hoge was delusional, claiming he had to kill the victims because they had killed his fictitious child.
Procedural Posture:
- Joshua Hoge was charged in criminal court with two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted murder.
- Hoge pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity but stipulated that he committed the acts with premeditated intent.
- The criminal court acquitted Hoge by reason of insanity and committed him to a state mental hospital.
- Pamela Kissinger's estate filed a separate civil wrongful death lawsuit against the state mental health agency and obtained a monetary settlement.
- The estate's personal representative then filed a petition in King County Superior Court (a trial court) to bar Hoge from receiving any of the settlement proceeds under the slayer statute.
- The Superior Court ruled that Hoge was a 'slayer' because he 'willfully and unlawfully killed' Kissinger.
- Hoge, as appellant, appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed that the killing was 'unlawful' but reversed on the definition of 'willful,' remanding the case for the trial court to apply the 'intentionally and designedly' standard.
- Hoge petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review on the 'unlawful' issue, and the Estate cross-petitioned on the 'willful' issue.
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Issue:
Does a criminal court's finding that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity prevent a civil court from determining the defendant is a 'slayer' under Washington's slayer statute (RCW 11.84.010) for committing a 'wilful and unlawful' killing, thereby barring him from receiving any benefit from the victim's estate?
Opinions:
Majority - Chambers, J.
No. A criminal acquittal by reason of insanity does not prevent a civil court from finding a killing was 'wilful and unlawful' under the slayer statute. Washington's slayer statute is a civil statute, and the determination of whether a person is a slayer must be made independently of any criminal proceeding. The court reasoned that an insanity defense does not make a homicide lawful; it merely excuses the defendant from criminal punishment. Unlike self-defense, which makes a killing lawful, insanity is an affirmative defense that concedes the defendant committed an unlawful act but argues against criminal culpability. The court also held that 'willful' under the slayer statute means 'intentionally and designedly,' a standard derived from common law and prior case law, not the broader 'knowingly' standard from the criminal code. Based on the trial court's findings that Hoge acted with premeditated intent and knew he was killing a human being, the court concluded Hoge's actions were both unlawful and willful, thus barring him from recovery.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between criminal culpability and civil liability, establishing that an acquittal by reason of insanity is not a defense in a civil slayer statute action. The case clarifies that 'unlawful' for civil purposes refers to the nature of the act itself (not being authorized by law), irrespective of the actor's mental state for criminal conviction. By reaffirming the definition of 'willful' as 'intentionally and designedly,' the court maintains a higher standard of intent for the civil slayer statute than for some criminal statutes. This precedent ensures that the equitable principle of preventing a person from profiting from their own wrong is upheld, even when the wrongdoer is not criminally responsible.
