In Re Estate of Butts
2003 WL 1571553, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2698, 102 S.W.3d 801 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
To invalidate a will on the grounds of undue influence, a contestant must prove the existence and exertion of influence, its effective operation to overpower the testator's mind, and that the will would not have been executed but for that influence, with mere opportunity to influence or suspicious circumstances being insufficient.
Facts:
- Ruth Irons and Hazel Butts, lifelong friends who traveled annually to Maine, orally agreed that the first to die would leave the other her estate, and the survivor would leave the remainder of her estate to both their relatives.
- Ruth Irons died in 1996 in Maine, and Hazel Butts came into possession of Irons' estate.
- Hazel Butts was diagnosed with terminal cancer in 1997.
- On October 30, 1997, Hazel Butts executed a will (the 'October will') designating Michael K. Stephenson, Irons' great-nephew, as the primary beneficiary and independent executor, and providing specific monetary bequests to Ashley and Jonathan Orr, also Irons' relatives.
- Believing she was near death, Hazel Butts expressed a desire to go to Maine for her final days, and at the time of her departure, there were no apparent problems between Butts and Stephenson.
- Hazel Butts traveled to Maine, where Evelyn Lee took care of her during her last days.
- During Butts' stay in Maine, she became critical of Michael K. Stephenson, believing he was harassing her, and expressed a desire to remove him from her will.
- On December 17, 1997, Hazel Butts executed a new will (the 'December will') that omitted Stephenson and the Orrs from the will, and named Evelyn Lee and Catherine Pointon as beneficiaries and executors, and Deborah Sample as a friend and advisor.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael K. Stephenson and Jeffrey L. Orr, as next friend of Ashley D. Orr and Jonathan M. Orr (contestants), contested the December will of Hazel H. Butts.
- Contestants claimed that Butts lacked testamentary capacity (later abandoned) and that the December will was procured by the undue influence of Catherine Pointon, Evelyn Lee, and Deborah Sample.
- Stephenson sought admission to probate of an earlier will executed by Butts (the 'October will').
- The proponents of the December will filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, alleging there was no evidence of undue influence.
- Contestants responded to the motion, arguing there was sufficient evidence to create a fact issue that Evelyn Lee and Deborah Sample had exercised undue influence.
- The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the proponents of the December will.
- Contestants appealed the trial court's granting of summary judgment.
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Issue:
Does the evidence presented by the contestants raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the will of Hazel H. Butts was the result of undue influence, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - David B. Gaultney
No, the will of Hazel H. Butts was not the result of undue influence, because the contestants failed to produce sufficient summary judgment evidence to establish the elements required to invalidate the will on that ground. The court held that to establish undue influence, contestants must prove (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) the effective operation of the influence to subvert or overpower the testator's mind; and (3) the execution of a will that the testator would not have executed but for the influence. The court emphasized that mere opportunity to exert influence is insufficient, and circumstantial evidence must be more consistent with undue influence than with a free will. Regarding the specific individuals alleged to have exerted influence: (1) Catherine Pointon: Contestants admitted having no evidence of undue influence. (2) Evelyn Lee: While Lee had opportunity (caring for Butts, arranging will execution), opportunity alone is not proof. Witnesses testified Butts was mentally capable and resistant to influence, and the attorney who prepared both wills had no concerns about her capacity. (3) Deborah Sample: There was no evidence she benefited from the December will, and her letter critical of Stephenson was consistent with her role as a friend and advisor, not necessarily undue influence. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment as no evidence of wrongdoing constituting undue influence was presented.
Dissenting - Don Burgess
Yes, there was more than a scintilla of circumstantial evidence on each of the elements of undue influence, creating a genuine issue of material fact that should have been decided by a jury. The dissent argued that undue influence is often subtle and proved by circumstantial evidence, where numerous circumstances, though individually insufficient, can collectively produce a reasonable belief of subverted free will. The dissent highlighted several factors for consideration, including the nature of relationships, opportunities for influence, circumstances of will drafting, fraudulent motive, and the testator's mental and physical state. Here, Butts and Irons had an agreement for their combined estates to benefit their respective families, which Butts initially honored in her October will. However, after Butts' terminal cancer diagnosis, her move to Maine with Evelyn Lee, her increasing weakness, and her sudden irritation with Stephenson, she changed her will to exclude Irons' family and include Lee as a beneficiary. The dissent believed these combined circumstances provided enough probative evidence to reverse the summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits, allowing a jury to weigh the evidence.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high evidentiary bar for proving undue influence, particularly at the summary judgment stage. It clarifies that simply demonstrating an opportunity for influence or circumstances that appear suspicious is insufficient; specific evidence of the exertion of influence and its subversion of the testator's free will is necessary. The majority's rigorous application of the 'no-evidence' summary judgment standard demonstrates that while undue influence can be proven by circumstantial evidence, such evidence must still be distinctively indicative of improper influence, not merely consistent with innocent acts. The dissent, in contrast, illustrates a judicial willingness to view cumulative circumstantial evidence more expansively to infer undue influence, highlighting the tension in judicial interpretation of such subtle claims.
