In re Eichorn
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant charged under an anti-camping ordinance is entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense if they present sufficient evidence that they were involuntarily homeless and had no adequate legal alternative to sleeping in a public place.
Facts:
- James Warner Eichorn was a 49-year-old Vietnam veteran and a long-time resident of Santa Ana who became homeless after losing his job.
- Eichorn sought casual labor work and would stay in motels when he could afford it, otherwise sleeping in public areas or shelters.
- On the night of January 25, 1993, all available shelter beds for a single homeless man in Santa Ana were occupied.
- Eichorn had previously been turned away from the local armory shelter when it was at capacity.
- That evening, Eichorn was found sleeping in a sleeping bag in the Santa Ana civic center, a public area where he felt there was 'safety in numbers'.
- A police officer cited Eichorn for violating the city's ordinance against camping in public areas.
Procedural Posture:
- James Eichorn was cited for misdemeanor violation of a Santa Ana city ordinance.
- At a pretrial hearing in municipal court, the judge ruled that Eichorn could not present a necessity defense to a jury.
- In light of the ruling, Eichorn waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a bench trial.
- The trial court found Eichorn guilty and sentenced him to community service.
- The appellate department of the superior court affirmed the conviction in a two-to-one decision without a written opinion.
- The appellate department denied Eichorn's request to certify the case for transfer to the Court of Appeal.
- Eichorn filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to allow a defendant charged with illegal camping to present a necessity defense to the jury, where the defendant offered evidence that he was involuntarily homeless and all local shelter beds were full?
Opinions:
Majority - Crosby, J.
Yes. A defendant is entitled to present a necessity defense to the jury when they have made a sufficient offer of proof, and the trial court's refusal to allow it here constitutes reversible error. The defense of necessity is available when a defendant acts to prevent a significant evil and has no adequate alternative. The court determined that the deprivation of sleep, a fundamental physiological need, qualifies as a 'significant evil.' Eichorn presented substantial evidence that his alternatives were inadequate, as all shelter beds were full on the night he was cited. The court rejected the trial judge's suggestions that trespassing on private property or walking to a different city were adequate legal alternatives, stating a city cannot solve its problems by 'foisting them onto nearby localities.' By erroneously denying Eichorn the right to present this defense, the court deprived him of his only defense, induced his waiver of a jury trial, and violated his due process rights.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the availability of the necessity defense for individuals experiencing homelessness who are prosecuted under anti-camping ordinances. It establishes that the basic human need for sleep can satisfy the 'significant evil' element of the defense, a crucial acknowledgment for status-based offenses. The ruling places a check on the enforcement of such ordinances by requiring courts to consider the actual, available alternatives for a homeless person. This creates a precedent that can be used to challenge the criminalization of homelessness when shelter space is insufficient, shifting the legal focus from the act of sleeping in public to the circumstances that compel it.
