In Re Devon T.
584 A.2d 1287, 1991 Md. App. LEXIS 29, 85 Md. App. 674 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
For a juvenile between the ages of seven and fourteen, the common law rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity can be overcome by evidence demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile knew their conduct was wrong. The quantum of proof required to rebut this presumption diminishes as the juvenile's age approaches fourteen.
Facts:
- A grandmother complained to officials at Booker T. Washington Middle School that several of her grandson's classmates, including a student named Edward, were regularly truant and using her home to sell drugs while she was away at work.
- The next morning at school, a security guard, William Jackson, was advised by a student informant to check Edward.
- Jackson searched Edward in the assistant principal's office and discovered thirty vials of cocaine.
- After his arrest, Edward told Officer Jackson, "You better get Devon T. ... he was with me."
- At the time of these events, Devon T. was 13 years, 10 months, and 2 weeks of age.
- Officer Jackson summoned Devon T. to the assistant principal's office and directed him to empty his pockets.
- The search of Devon T. produced a brown bag that contained twenty zip-lock pink plastic bags of heroin.
- In a subsequent statement to a Juvenile Services Agency interviewer, Devon T. admitted he had been selling drugs for two days because he "just wanted something to do."
Procedural Posture:
- Devon T. was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a juvenile court, with committing an act which would constitute possession of heroin with intent to distribute if committed by an adult.
- Devon T. raised the common law infancy defense before a juvenile master.
- Following a hearing, the juvenile master found Devon T. to be delinquent.
- A judge of the Circuit Court reviewed the master's findings and also found Devon T. delinquent, entering an adjudication of delinquency.
- Devon T. (appellant) appealed the adjudication of delinquency to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does the State present legally sufficient evidence to rebut the common law presumption of criminal incapacity for a juvenile who is 13 years and 10 months old by demonstrating he knew his conduct was wrong, based on the circumstances of the offense and his conduct in court?
Opinions:
Majority - Moylan, J.
Yes, the State presented legally sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of incapacity. To overcome the presumption that a juvenile between seven and fourteen is incapable of committing a crime, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile knew the difference between right and wrong and understood their act was wrong. The strength of this presumption diminishes as the child approaches the age of fourteen. Here, Devon T.'s age of nearly fourteen meant the State's burden of proof was relatively small. The court found the State met this burden through circumstantial evidence, including: 1) Devon's age, which placed him in a group where the vast majority possess cognitive capacity; 2) the nature of the crime itself, as drug distribution is a 'street wise' activity that implies knowledge of illegality and the need for concealment; 3) Devon's conduct in court, where his understanding of the right to remain silent suggested comprehension of criminality; and 4) his apparent adherence to a 'Code of Silence' post-adjudication, which implied a conscious alignment against lawful authority. Taken together, these circumstances were sufficient to permit the inference that Devon T. knew his actions were wrong.
Analysis:
This case provides a modern application of the common law infancy defense within the context of juvenile delinquency proceedings. It clarifies that the standard for rebutting the presumption of incapacity is the cognitive 'right-wrong' test derived from M'Naghten, not a more complex psychological evaluation. The court's decision emphasizes that circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of the crime itself and the defendant's age and demeanor, is sufficient to prove a juvenile's knowledge of wrongdoing. This gives prosecutors a clear framework for overcoming the infancy defense, particularly for older juveniles engaged in sophisticated criminal activities, without needing to present expert testimony on the juvenile's mental state.
