In re Custody of B.M.H.
Not provided in case text (2013)
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Rule of Law:
A former stepparent may maintain a de facto parentage action if they meet a four-part equitable test and no specific statutory avenue for parentage exists, particularly in unique family constellations; however, third-party custody petitions require a high burden of proving actual detriment to the child's growth and development, not merely a disruption of a relationship.
Facts:
- Laurie Holt and Michael Holt had a son, C.H., in 1995, but separated in 1998.
- Laurie's new fiancé, the biological father of B.M.H., died in an industrial accident in 1999 while Laurie was three months pregnant with B.M.H.
- Michael Holt provided emotional support to Laurie during her pregnancy with B.M.H., was present at B.M.H.'s birth, and shortly after, married Laurie Holt.
- Michael and Laurie divorced in 2001, but B.M.H. generally followed the same visitation schedule as C.H. with Michael, developing a close relationship.
- In 2002, Laurie changed B.M.H.'s last name to Michael's last name, and in 2007, they discussed Michael adopting B.M.H., though it was not pursued due to concerns about B.M.H.'s survivor benefits.
- In late 2009 or early 2010, Michael learned that Laurie planned to move with B.M.H. approximately 50 miles away from Vancouver, Washington, to live with her new boyfriend.
Procedural Posture:
- On February 23, 2010, Michael Holt filed a nonparental custody petition and a de facto parentage petition in the trial court.
- The trial court initially found that Michael Holt established a prima facie case for de facto parentage.
- Upon Ms. Holt's motion for revision, and after the Washington Supreme Court issued In re Parentage of M.F., the trial court reversed its decision, granting Ms. Holt's revision motion and dismissing Michael Holt's de facto parentage action.
- The trial court later found adequate cause existed to proceed to a show cause hearing on Michael Holt's nonparental custody petition.
- Ms. Holt moved for discretionary review of the trial court's adequate cause finding to the Court of Appeals.
- Michael Holt appealed the trial court's dismissal of his de facto parentage action to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals consolidated both appeals and reinstated Michael Holt's de facto parentage petition, while affirming the trial court's order for a show cause hearing on the nonparental custody petition.
- Ms. Holt petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review, which was granted.
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Issue:
1. Does a nonparent seeking third-party custody satisfy the adequate cause standard by alleging that the custodial parent's lifestyle is unstable and will disrupt the child's relationship with the nonparent? 2. Is a former stepparent categorically barred from petitioning for de facto parentage of a child with whom they formed a parent-child relationship with the biological parent's consent?
Opinions:
Majority - Gonzalez, J.
No, a nonparent seeking third-party custody does not satisfy the adequate cause standard by alleging that the custodial parent's lifestyle is unstable or that a planned move will disrupt the child's relationship with the nonparent, because such allegations do not meet the high burden of showing actual detriment to the child's growth and development, which is constitutionally required. The State cannot interfere with a fit parent's liberty interest in child custody unless the parent is unfit or custody with them would result in 'actual detriment' to the child, a standard not met by allegations of unstable dating patterns or a disruptive move alone. Yes, a former stepparent is not categorically barred from petitioning for de facto parentage of a child with whom they formed a parent-child relationship with the biological parent's consent, especially when specific statutory avenues for parentage do not apply to their unique circumstances. Unlike the specific scenario in In re Parentage of M.F., which involved two existing biological parents and a statutory scheme, Mr. Holt entered B.M.H.'s life at birth after the biological father's death and formed a parent-child relationship with Ms. Holt's consent, a situation not contemplated by the legislature. The de facto parentage doctrine, as established in In re Parentage of L.B., provides an equitable remedy to fill this statutory void, and its requirement of consent from the natural parent adequately protects parents' fundamental rights while allowing legitimate parent-child relationships to be adjudicated.
Concurring/dissenting - Madsen, C.J.
Yes, I concur that Michael Holt did not establish adequate cause for a nonparental custody petition, as his allegations did not meet the high burden of showing Ms. Holt was unfit or that her custody would cause actual detriment to B.M.H.'s development. No, a stepparent should not be allowed to pursue a de facto parentage claim because existing third-party custody statutes (Chapter 26.10 RCW) already provide a statutory avenue, and recognizing de facto parentage in this context would undermine a fit parent's fundamental constitutional rights. The court's precedent in M.F. explicitly stated that the de facto parent theory does not apply to stepparents, who are considered nonparents. The 'consent' prong of the de facto parent test is too easily met in stepparent situations, where a parent naturally encourages a spouse to act parentally within the marriage, which does not equate to consent for a permanent parent-child relationship post-divorce. This approach infringes upon a parent's fundamental constitutional rights, which demand a higher standard (unfitness or actual detriment) for state interference, and disproportionately impacts single mothers.
Dissenting in part - Wiggins, J.
Yes, I concur with the majority's conclusion that Michael Holt did not establish adequate cause for his third-party custody claim. No, the de facto parentage doctrine should not apply in this case because the legislative 'gap' it was created to fill in L.B. (concerning same-sex partners' parentage rights) has since been addressed by the 2009 and 2011 statutory amendments. These amendments granted state-registered domestic partners parity with married spouses and codified aspects of the de facto parentage doctrine within the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), signaling the legislature's intent to create a comprehensive statutory framework for parentage. Expanding a common law doctrine when the legislature has acted usurps the legislative role. Furthermore, the fundamental right of parents to control child-rearing should not be easily waived by mere consent to a nonparent's temporary parent-like relationship; such a waiver should require clear evidence of intent, ideally through formal documentation, which is absent here.
Analysis:
This case is significant for both narrowing the scope of nonparental custody petitions and clarifying the applicability of the de facto parentage doctrine. It reinforces the high constitutional bar for third-party interference with fit parents' rights, requiring 'actual detriment' rather than merely 'best interests' of the child, thus limiting judicial discretion in custody disputes. Simultaneously, it carves out an equitable path for individuals, including former stepparents, who have genuinely functioned as parents with the legal parent's consent in unique family structures not explicitly covered by statute. The decision highlights the Washington Supreme Court's ongoing role in using common law to address evolving family dynamics where legislative intent may not be fully explicit, creating a balance between parental autonomy and the recognition of diverse parent-child bonds.
