In Re Crisan Estate
362 Mich. 569, 107 N.W.2d 907 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
Where a person provides necessary emergency services to another who is unable to consent due to their physical or mental condition, the law will imply a contract (quasi-contract) requiring the recipient or their estate to pay for the services to prevent unjust enrichment.
Facts:
- Sosa Crisan, an 87-year-old widow, collapsed while shopping on March 17, 1955.
- The Detroit police department took her in an emergency to Receiving Hospital, a public hospital.
- Crisan was later transferred to Central Hospital, where she remained until her death on February 9, 1956.
- Crisan never regained consciousness during the approximately 11 months she was hospitalized.
- An investigation by the City of Detroit revealed that Crisan owned a home valued at $7,000 and had a small income from rent.
- Because she had assets, the Wayne County board of social welfare determined she was ineligible for public relief.
- The City did not take steps to appoint a guardian for Crisan during her hospitalization.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Detroit presented a claim for hospital services against Sosa Crisan's estate in probate court.
- A referee in the probate court allowed the claim in its entirety.
- The executor of Crisan's estate appealed, and the probate court affirmed the referee's decision.
- The executor then appealed to the circuit court, which also affirmed the probate court's order.
- The circuit court denied the executor's motion for a new trial.
- The executor (appellant) now brings the instant appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan against the City of Detroit (appellee).
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Issue:
Does the law imply a promise to pay for necessary emergency medical services rendered by a hospital to an unconscious person who, due to their condition, cannot consent to the treatment?
Opinions:
Majority - Edwards, J.
Yes. The law will imply a promise to pay for emergency services rendered to an unconscious patient. This obligation arises not from a contract implied in fact, as there was no meeting of the minds, but from a contract implied in law, also known as a quasi-contract. The court adopted the principle articulated in the Restatement of Restitution, § 116, which allows restitution for services rendered to another without their consent if the services were necessary to save the person's life, the provider intended to charge, the provider had no reason to believe the recipient would refuse if competent, and it was impossible for the recipient to give consent. The court reasoned this rule exists to encourage aid in emergencies by assuring compensation to those who render it. The court also rejected the argument that a public hospital has a duty to provide free care to those who can afford to pay, finding no statutory or charter provision imposing such a limitation.
Analysis:
This case formally incorporates the doctrine of quasi-contract for emergency services, as outlined in the Restatement of Restitution § 116, into Michigan common law. It solidifies the legal principle that liability in such cases is based on preventing the unjust enrichment of the recipient, rather than on a fictional mutual assent. The decision clarifies that the obligation to pay for necessary services is not defeated by a patient's inability to consent. Furthermore, the ruling establishes that a 'public' hospital is not necessarily a 'free' hospital and may seek reimbursement from patients with the ability to pay, absent a specific legal duty to provide free care.
