In Re Continental Airlines, Inc.
1998 Tex. LEXIS 150, 988 S.W.2d 733, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 147 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A suit seeking a declaratory judgment is not transformed into a suit for an injunction for mandatory venue purposes simply because the plaintiff also seeks temporary injunctive relief, as long as the dominant purpose of the suit is to obtain a declaration of rights and not primarily to secure an injunction.
Facts:
- In 1968, the City of Fort Worth and the City of Dallas executed agreements to establish Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) and to limit certain flights from other local airports, including Love Field.
- In the late 1970s, the cities agreed to allow limited "turn around flights" from Love Field to states adjacent to Texas.
- Around the same time, Congress passed the Wright Amendment, incorporating similar flight restrictions into federal law.
- In 1997, Congress enacted the Shelby Amendment, which relaxed some of the restrictions imposed by the Wright Amendment.
- Following the Shelby Amendment, Legend Airlines and others planned to initiate new flights out of Love Field.
- On May 19, 1998, Continental Airlines announced its intent to begin scheduled passenger flights from Love Field to Cleveland, Ohio, starting July 1, 1998.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Fort Worth sued the City of Dallas, Legend Airlines, and others in Tarrant County district court, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding airport agreements.
- American Airlines intervened, aligning with Fort Worth.
- After Continental Airlines announced new flights, Fort Worth amended its petition to add claims against Continental.
- Dallas, Legend, and Continental (the relators) each filed separate motions to transfer venue to their respective counties of domicile, arguing the suit was primarily for an injunction.
- Fort Worth requested a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction to stop Continental's planned service.
- The Tarrant County trial court denied the motions to transfer venue.
- The relators petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to transfer the case, but the court of appeals denied relief.
- The relators then sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's request for temporary injunctive relief necessarily transform a lawsuit, which primarily seeks a declaratory judgment to construe a contract, into an 'injunction suit' that is subject to the mandatory venue provision requiring trial in the defendant's county of domicile?
Opinions:
Majority - Gonzalez, Justice
No. A request for temporary injunctive relief does not transform a declaratory judgment action into an 'injunction suit' for venue purposes where the dominant purpose of the suit remains the declaration of rights. The court reasoned that the mandatory venue statute for injunctions applies only when the relief sought is 'purely or primarily injunctive.' Here, the City of Fort Worth's pleadings stated a justiciable controversy regarding the interpretation of its 1968 agreements with Dallas, which could be fully resolved by a declaratory judgment. The request for a temporary injunction against Continental Airlines was merely ancillary to the primary goal of clarifying the parties' contractual rights. The court emphasized that a plaintiff has the right to choose its remedy, and Fort Worth chose to seek a declaratory judgment, not a permanent injunction. The mere possibility that injunctive relief might be needed later to enforce a judgment does not change the fundamental character of the suit at its inception.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the 'dominant purpose' test in Texas venue law, particularly in disputes involving both declaratory and injunctive relief. The decision reinforces the plaintiff's traditional power to frame the nature of their lawsuit and, by extension, influence the choice of venue. It establishes that courts should not elevate a request for ancillary, temporary relief over the primary, ultimate relief sought in the pleadings when determining the suit's character for venue purposes. This holding prevents defendants from easily defeating a plaintiff's venue choice by merely pointing to a request for a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction in a suit that is substantively about determining legal rights and obligations.
