In Re CKG
2005 WL 2464677, 173 S.W.3d 714 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A woman who gestates and gives birth to a child conceived via a donated egg is the child's legal mother when she and the genetic father intended for her to be the mother prior to conception, and there is no competing maternity claim from the egg donor.
Facts:
- In 1999, Dr. Charles K. G. and Ms. Cindy C., an unmarried couple, decided to have a child together.
- Due to Cindy's age, they chose to pursue in vitro fertilization using an anonymous donor's eggs and Charles's sperm.
- On May 2, 2000, both parties signed a 'Recipient Consent' form with a fertility center, which explicitly stated that Cindy would be the mother of any resulting child and would accept all legal responsibilities of parenthood.
- Charles paid for the procedure, which resulted in Cindy becoming pregnant with triplets.
- During the pregnancy, Charles lived with Cindy and supported her.
- On February 21, 2001, Cindy gave birth to the three children. The official birth certificates list Charles as the father and Cindy as the mother.
- After the births, the couple lived together, shared parenting duties, and jointly purchased a new home for the family.
- The couple's relationship subsequently deteriorated, leading to a dispute over Cindy's parental status.
Procedural Posture:
- Ms. Cindy C. filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Williamson County to establish parentage and to obtain custody and child support from Dr. Charles K. G.
- In response, Dr. Charles K. G. argued Cindy C. lacked standing as a parent and sought sole and exclusive custody.
- Following a bench trial, the juvenile court ruled that Cindy C. was the children's legal mother, awarded joint custody with Cindy as the primary custodial parent, and ordered Charles to pay child support.
- Dr. Charles K. G., as the appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment, holding that Cindy C. was the legal mother based on the 'intent test' and, alternatively, that Charles K. G. was estopped from challenging her parental status.
- The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted Dr. Charles K. G.'s application for permission to appeal.
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Issue:
Is a woman who gestates and gives birth to children conceived via an anonymous donor's egg and the sperm of her partner the legal mother of those children, when both parties intended for her to be the mother?
Opinions:
Majority - Drowota, C.J.
Yes, a woman who gestates and gives birth to children in these circumstances is their legal mother. The court determined that Tennessee's existing parentage statutes, which define a mother as 'biological,' were not designed to address situations where technology separates the genetic and gestational components of maternity. The court declined to adopt either the broad 'intent test' from other jurisdictions or a strict 'genetic test,' finding a legislative solution more appropriate for such a complex policy area. Instead, the court created a narrow, fact-specific holding, concluding that Cindy is the legal mother based on a combination of factors: (1) the pre-conception, bona fide intent of both parties for her to be the mother and her agreement to assume parental responsibilities; (2) the fact that she gestated and gave birth to the children as her own; and (3) the absence of any competing maternity claim from the anonymous egg donor. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would create the absurd result of the children having no legal mother, which contravenes public policy and the best interests of the children.
Dissenting - Birch, J.
A dissenting opinion was filed, but its text was not included in the provided case document.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a new, albeit narrow, common-law framework in Tennessee for determining maternity in assisted reproduction cases involving egg donation. By rejecting a single bright-line rule (like genetics or intent alone), the court created a flexible, multi-factor test tailored to the specific facts, providing legal recognition and protection to gestational mothers who lack a genetic link to their children. The ruling is significant for its judicial restraint; while resolving the immediate dispute, it explicitly defers to the legislature to create a comprehensive statutory scheme for the complex issues arising from modern reproductive technologies. This case sets a precedent that balances genetics, intent, and the biological reality of gestation in parentage disputes, likely influencing future cases until the legislature acts.
