In re Banks
295 N.C. 236, 244 S.E.2d 386 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal statute that appears facially vague or overbroad may be rendered constitutional if it is susceptible to a narrowing judicial construction that requires proof of a specific wrongful intent, thereby providing fair notice of the prohibited conduct.
Facts:
- A respondent was charged with violating North Carolina General Statute 14-202.
- The statute defines the offense as when a person "shall peep secretly into any room occupied by a female person."
- The respondent's legal challenge arose from the application of this statute to his alleged conduct.
- The specific underlying actions of the respondent that led to the charge are not detailed in the court's opinion, as the appeal focuses solely on the facial constitutionality of the statute.
Procedural Posture:
- The respondent was charged in the District Court of Guilford County, North Carolina, with violating the 'Peeping Tom' statute, G.S. 14-202.
- At the trial court level, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the statute was unconstitutional.
- The trial court judge agreed with the respondent and ruled that G.S. 14-202 is unconstitutional.
- The State, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's ruling to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
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Issue:
Is North Carolina's 'Peeping Tom' statute, G.S. 14-202, which prohibits any person from secretly peeping into a room occupied by a female, unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the Due Process Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, J.
No. The North Carolina 'Peeping Tom' statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Applying principles of statutory construction to avoid an unconstitutional result, the statute is interpreted to prohibit not merely looking, but wrongful spying with the specific intent to invade a female's legitimate expectation of privacy. The court presumes statutes are constitutional and will adopt a constitutional interpretation over an unconstitutional one if the language permits. The court's primary duty is to effectuate legislative intent and avoid absurd consequences that a literal reading might produce. By interpreting the statutory phrase 'peep secretly,' the court infuses a scienter, or wrongful intent, requirement. This judicial gloss narrows the statute's scope, providing clear notice to the public of what conduct is proscribed—spying for the purpose of invading privacy—and preventing the criminalization of innocent or inadvertent acts. Therefore, the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of what is forbidden and is not overbroad because it does not sweep in a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
Analysis:
This decision exemplifies the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, where a court saves a statute from being struck down by applying a narrowing construction. By interpreting the ambiguous term 'secretly' to import a specific intent to invade privacy, the court adds a crucial element that the prosecution must prove, thus curing potential vagueness and overbreadth defects. This precedent reinforces the judiciary's power to interpret statutes in light of their purpose and ensures that laws targeting malicious conduct are not invalidated simply because their literal text could be applied to innocent behavior. The decision effectively requires prosecutors in future 'Peeping Tom' cases to prove not just the act of peeping but also the defendant's subjective wrongful purpose.
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