In Re Baby" M"
217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A surrogate parenting agreement, where a woman contracts to be artificially inseminated with a man's sperm and relinquish the child to him and his wife, is a valid and enforceable contract under New Jersey law, provided that its specific performance is determined to be in the child's best interests under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.
Facts:
- William and Elizabeth Stern desired to have a child, but Elizabeth Stern was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, making pregnancy medically risky for her.
- The Sterns contacted the Infertility Center of New York (ICNY) to find a surrogate mother, and Mary Beth Whitehead, already a mother of two, agreed to be a surrogate, stating her motivations were both altruistic and financial.
- In February 1985, William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead signed a surrogate parenting agreement, stipulating that Mary Beth would be artificially inseminated with William Stern's sperm, carry the child to term, deliver and surrender the child to him, and renounce her parental rights, for which she would be paid $10,000 plus expenses.
- Mary Beth Whitehead's husband, Richard Whitehead, acknowledged his refusal to consent to the artificial insemination, and William Stern was later confirmed through an HLA test to be the biological father.
- After nine insemination attempts, Mary Beth Whitehead conceived in July 1985, and "Baby M" (Melissa) was born on March 27, 1986; however, Mary Beth Whitehead refused to relinquish the child to William Stern, listing Richard Whitehead's name on the birth certificate.
- Mary Beth Whitehead, expressing severe emotional distress and suicidal thoughts, persuaded the Sterns to allow her to take Baby M for a week-long visit, during which she fled with the infant to Florida on April 3, 1986.
- During the 87 days Mary Beth Whitehead remained in Florida with the child, she made threats to kill herself and Baby M, and falsely accused William Stern of sexually molesting her other daughter.
- On July 31, 1986, Florida authorities, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, removed Baby M from Mary Beth Whitehead's care and transferred physical custody to William and Elizabeth Stern.
Procedural Posture:
- On May 5, 1986, William and Elizabeth Stern filed an ex-parte application for an order to show cause for summary judgment to enforce a surrogate-parenting contract, along with a verified complaint seeking enforcement, surrender of the infant, restraints against interference with custody, termination of Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights, and adoption by Elizabeth Stern.
- The court issued a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause, returnable on May 27, 1986.
- After being served with the court order, Mary Beth and Richard Whitehead removed the child from New Jersey and traveled to Florida.
- On May 27, 1986, the Whiteheads did not appear, and the temporary restraint order was continued until July 17, 1986.
- On July 17, 1986, with no appearance from the Whiteheads, the court ordered the surrender of the infant to William Stern, granted him temporary custody, restrained the Whiteheads from interfering, and authorized filing the New Jersey custody order in Florida.
- William Stern instituted criminal proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4a (unlawful interference with custody) after the Whiteheads removed the child from New Jersey.
- On August 6, 1986, the Whiteheads' first attorney entered an appearance.
- On August 13, 1986, the court, on its own motion and over the Sterns' objection, ordered the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the infant.
- On August 22, 1986, the court ordered an HLA blood test to determine paternity based on Mary Beth Whitehead's claim that Richard Whitehead might be the father, though she later failed to disclose his vasectomy.
- The HLA test proved William Stern was the biological father with 99.96% probability, and the court subsequently ruled him the natural biological father and Mary Beth Whitehead the biological mother.
- On September 2, 1986, Mary Beth and Richard Whitehead filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim seeking custody and damages for fraud.
- The court initially sealed the proceedings, but after the maternal grandmother spoke to the press, and the Appellate Division reversed an order sealing Elizabeth Stern's medical deposition, the case proceeded in open court.
- On September 10, 1986, an order was entered for limited visitation for Mary Beth Whitehead, which was expanded on October 7, 1986, and supervised visitation was further increased on October 20, 1986.
- On September 18, 1986, writs of attachment against the Whiteheads' personal property were discharged.
- On September 25, 1986, a court order required the $10,000 payment from the contract to be deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court.
- A motion for pendente lite visitation by the maternal grandparents was denied, leading them to file a separate complaint for visitation, and their subsequent motion for pendente lite visitation was denied, with the issue deferred to the plenary trial.
- On November 6, 1986, the court entered its pretrial order defining the trial issues.
- On November 18, 1986, the court directed a bifurcated trial, with contract issues to be tried first, followed by best-interests issues.
- On December 3, 1986, the Appellate Division reversed the bifurcation order, requiring a trial on all issues to begin on January 5, 1987, with all discovery completed prior.
- On December 3, 1986, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered a non-bifurcated trial to begin as scheduled, but permitted the trial court to define the discovery schedule and enter final judgment on less than all issues pleaded.
- The trial commenced on January 5, 1987.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a surrogate parenting agreement, which involves artificial insemination and a promise to surrender a child for adoption, constitute a valid and enforceable contract, and if so, what legal standards govern its enforcement, particularly regarding the child's best interests?
Opinions:
Majority - Sorkow, P.J.F.P.
Yes, a surrogate parenting agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable contract. The court reasoned that the right to procreate is a fundamental constitutional right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, extending to non-coital methods like surrogacy. Payments to the surrogate are for her services in gestation, not for the sale of a child, which would violate the Thirteenth Amendment and adoption laws. The court found no evidence of fraud, unconscionability, or that the contract was one of adhesion, noting Mary Beth Whitehead was competent and understood the terms, and the definition of 'infertility' was appropriately broad. New Jersey's adoption and parental rights termination statutes were deemed inapplicable to surrogacy contracts, as they did not exist or contemplate such arrangements at the time of their enactment. Therefore, the court’s decision was guided by common law contract principles and its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction, which mandates prioritizing the child's best interests. After a comprehensive review of expert testimony regarding the child's psychological and physical welfare, the court found clear and convincing evidence that Melissa's best interests would be served by being placed in William Stern's sole custody. Mary Beth Whitehead demonstrated impulsivity, manipulativeness, and a lack of candor, and the Whitehead household lacked the stability, educational emphasis, and emotional environment conducive to Melissa's special needs. Consequently, the court ordered specific performance of the surrogate parenting agreement, terminated Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights, and denied grandparental visitation due to the Messers' lack of candor and participation in obstructing court orders, which would be divisive to parental authority and contrary to Melissa's best interests.
Analysis:
This landmark decision was one of the first in the United States to directly address the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. It established that while such contracts are generally valid and constitutionally protected under the right to procreate, they are ultimately subservient to the paramount consideration of the child's best interests. The court's broad interpretation of its parens patriae power and its rejection of applying traditional adoption and parental termination statutes to surrogacy highlighted the legal vacuum in this rapidly evolving area of reproductive technology, signaling a clear call for legislative action. The comprehensive "best interests" analysis, drawing heavily on mental health expert testimony, set a precedent for judicial scrutiny in novel family formation disputes, placing the child's welfare above the contractual expectations of the adults involved.
