In Re Advisory From the Governor
1993 R.I. LEXIS 232, 633 A.2d 664, 1993 WL 469280 (1993)
Rule of Law:
Ethics legislation imposing temporary 'revolving door' restrictions on public officials' future employment is constitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in preventing conflicts of interest and promoting public trust, and it does not violate separation of powers if it does not assume essential powers of a coordinate branch, disrupt its duties, and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy.
Facts:
- Rhode Island General Laws (G.L.1956 (1990 Reenactment) § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and (o)) were enacted, creating 'revolving door' restrictions.
- These subsections generally prohibited state elected officials from seeking or accepting employment with other state agencies for a period of one year after leaving state office, with exceptions for certain high-level appointments or for constitutional offices.
- The laws also permitted the Rhode Island Ethics Commission to authorize exceptions to these restrictions if doing so would not create an 'appearance of impropriety'.
- Rhode Island Ethics Commission Regulation 36-14-5006 prohibited elected or appointed officials from accepting any financially beneficial appointment or election by their former body for one year after leaving, unless the Ethics Commission approved it due to 'substantial hardship' for the body or municipality.
- Rhode Island Ethics Commission Regulation 36-14-5007 prohibited members of the General Assembly from seeking or accepting new state employment or consultant roles, not held at the time of their election, while serving or for one year after leaving legislative office.
- The Governor of Rhode Island expressed concerns that these statutes and regulations created an unconstitutional classification of individuals, relied on irrebuttable presumptions, were overly broad, and infringed upon his power to appoint qualified individuals.
- The Ethics Commission asserted that the General Assembly's statute was unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with its own regulations, granting broader exceptions than the regulations' stricter standards.
Procedural Posture:
- His Excellency Bruce Sundlun, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, submitted a request for a written advisory opinion to the Rhode Island Supreme Court on four specific questions concerning the constitutionality of certain state ethics statutes and Ethics Commission regulations.
- Briefs were submitted by the Governor’s office and the Attorney General’s office.
- Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the Rhode Island Ethics Commission, Common Cause of Rhode Island, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Rhode Island Bar Association.
- Marcia B. Reback, as an intervenor, filed a brief.
- The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the propriety of the Governor's request for an advisory opinion, noting that while the questions did not concern a present constitutional duty awaiting performance by the Governor, it would exercise its discretion to waive this procedural defect for some questions due to their paramount public and constitutional importance, but not for others due to pending litigation or lack of proper appellate review.
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Issue:
Are Rhode Island General Laws § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and (o), and Ethics Commission Regulations 36-14-5006 and 36-14-5007, which impose 'revolving door' restrictions on public officials seeking future state employment, unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses or Article 1, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, or do they seriously impinge upon the abilities of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches to perform their duties in violation of separation of powers?
Opinions:
Majority - Acting Chief Justice Joseph R. Weisberger
No, Rhode Island General Laws § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and (o), and Ethics Commission Regulations 36-14-5006 and 36-14-5007 are not unconstitutional and do not seriously impinge upon any branch of government. The court first clarified that the General Assembly’s statute and the Ethics Commission’s regulations are not inconsistent; rather, they are compatible and complement each other, with the General Assembly having concurrent power to enact ethics laws that are not contradictory to the commission's code. Regarding the Equal Protection challenge, the court applied the rational-basis test because candidacy or appointment to public office is not a fundamental right, citing Clements v. Fashing (1982) and implicitly limiting Cummings v. Godin (1977). The legislation is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of preventing public officials from using their positions for private gain, enhancing public confidence, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety. The one-year waiting period is a 'de minimis burden' on political aspirations and does not unfairly burden political opportunities. For the Due Process claim, the court also applied the rational-basis test, concluding that since no fundamental right is affected, the legislation passes constitutional muster under substantive due process for the same reasons as the equal protection analysis. The court rejected the argument that the legislation relies on an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, noting that the presumption is temporary (one-year duration) and rebuttable, as the Ethics Commission can grant exceptions. The court declined to fully address a procedural due process challenge due to the lack of a sufficiently clear claim, but suggested that the legislative process itself provides due process for laws affecting a general class of persons. Concerning the Overbreadth claim, the court determined that the Governor lacked standing because he failed to identify a specific First Amendment restraint. The interest in obtaining state employment, minimally restricted by the statute, does not fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. Finally, addressing the Separation of Powers challenge, the court applied the three-prong test from Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1980), adopted in State v. Jacques (1989). The court found that the legislative branch had not assumed essential powers of the executive; the minimal, temporary impact on the pool of candidates does not 'disrupt' the Governor's ability to carry out his duties; and the legislation serves a legitimate purpose of promoting public trust and preventing abuse of office. Therefore, the statutes and regulations do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Analysis:
This advisory opinion is significant for clarifying the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for ethics legislation that imposes 'revolving door' restrictions on public officials. By definitively stating that candidacy for public office is not a fundamental right and applying rational-basis review, the court provides a strong framework for upholding such laws against equal protection and due process challenges. The ruling also solidifies the concurrent authority of the General Assembly and the Ethics Commission in enacting ethics laws, provided they are complementary. This case sets a precedent that states have broad power to legislate ethical conduct among public servants to preserve public trust, even if it places temporary restrictions on employment opportunities.
