No, one part of Congress cannot do that. When the House vetoed the decision, it was essentially creating a new, specific law that said, 'Chadha must be deported.' The Constitution has strict rules for making laws: a bill has to be passed by BOTH the House and the Senate, and THEN it has to be sent to the President to be signed or vetoed. The House's veto skipped the Senate and the President entirely, so it's unconstitutional.

Yes, the House's action was wrong, but for a different reason. The House wasn't acting like a lawmaker; it was acting like a court. It looked at Chadha's individual case and made a judgment about his rights. That's the job of the judicial branch. Congress can't act as a judge and jury for one person; that violates the separation of powers.

Yes, Congress should be able to do this. This 'legislative veto' is a really important tool. It lets Congress give power to government agencies to handle complex issues but still allows Congress to keep them in check. The veto doesn't create a new law; it's just a condition that was part of the original law that everyone, including the President, already agreed to. Getting rid of it makes it harder for our government to work in the modern world.

The court made a mistake by deciding the main issue. The part of the law allowing the veto is so tied to the part letting the judge stop deportations that you can't have one without the other. If the veto is illegal, then the power to stop deportations should be illegal too. That means Chadha should be deported anyway. The court shouldn't rewrite laws for Congress.

Yes, the rule letting one part of Congress reject the Attorney General's decision is unconstitutional. The Constitution requires both the House and Senate to pass laws together, and then the President has to approve. This rule goes against that by letting the House act like it's making a law all by itself. It doesn't matter if this rule is convenient or efficient - the Constitution is the highest law and has to be followed. The Constitution doesn't let the President or Congress have total control over immigration rules, and the Court has a duty to enforce what the Constitution says about how laws are made.

I disagree because the Court's decision goes too far and ignores the important role that rules like this have played for the past 50 years. This rule is a useful tool that lets the President and Congress work out big disagreements, and it doesn't go against the separation of powers when Congress allows it. Congress has put rules like this in many laws since the 1930s, and Presidents have accepted them in exchange for getting more power from Congress. The Court shouldn't get rid of all these rules in hundreds of laws based on this one unusual case.

I agree this particular rule is unconstitutional, but for a more specific reason than the majority. When Congress decides a specific person doesn't meet the legal requirements to stay in the country, it's acting like a court and going against the separation of powers. Congress didn't make a general law here, but singled out six people including Chadha and overruled the immigration agency, without providing the protections courts usually provide. I wouldn't say all rules like this are unconstitutional though.

No, it is not constitutional for one part of Congress to be able to reject the Attorney General's choice to let an immigrant stay in the U.S. without the other part of Congress or the President being involved. The Constitution requires both the House and Senate to pass laws together, and then the President has to approve. This rule goes against that by letting the House act like it's making a law all by itself. It doesn't matter if this rule is convenient or efficient - the Constitution is the highest law and has to be followed. The Constitution doesn't let the President or Congress have total control over immigration rules, and the Court has a duty to enforce what the Constitution says about how laws are made.

Yes, it is constitutional for one part of Congress to be able to reject the Attorney General's choice to let an immigrant stay in the U.S. without the other part of Congress or the President being involved. I disagree because the Court's decision goes too far and ignores the important role that rules like this have played for the past 50 years. This rule is a useful tool that lets the President and Congress work out big disagreements, and it doesn't go against the separation of powers when Congress allows it. Congress has put rules like this in many laws since the 1930s, and Presidents have accepted them in exchange for getting more power from Congress. The Court shouldn't get rid of all these rules in hundreds of laws based on this one unusual case.

No, it is not constitutional for one part of Congress to be able to reject the Attorney General's choice to let an immigrant stay in the U.S. without the other part of Congress or the President being involved. I agree this particular rule is unconstitutional, but for a more specific reason than the majority. When Congress decides a specific person doesn't meet the legal requirements to stay in the country, it's acting like a court and going against the separation of powers. Congress didn't make a general law here, but singled out six people including Chadha and overruled the immigration agency, without providing the protections courts usually provide. I wouldn't say all rules like this are unconstitutional though.

I disagree with the main decision of the Court. The decision says that a part of the law that lets one part of Congress cancel decisions by the executive branch is not allowed by the Constitution. I think this view is too strict and ignores how our government needs to work today. This part of the law, called the legislative veto, is really important because it lets Congress quickly stop actions by the executive branch if they don't follow what Congress wanted or what's best for the public, without having to make a whole new law. This makes sure the executive branch does what it's supposed to do and helps Congress react fast to new situations. The Constitution was meant to be flexible enough to handle new and changing needs, and it doesn't say everything about how laws must be made. So, I believe this legislative veto should be allowed because it's a practical tool for overseeing the executive branch and doesn't actually go against what the Constitution says.

We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional

—this Court held unconstitutional the congressional-veto provision in § 244 (c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 216, as amended, 8 USC § 1254 (c)(2), and found it severable from the remainder of that Act.

—holding that "[i] f the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it

The Supreme Court counsels that "this concern of encroachment and aggrandizement" animates judicial decisions on the separation of powers and arouses vigilance against the " `hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power.'"

—the Supreme Court held that a one-house legislative veto was unconstitutional in the context of a deportation order by the Attorney General.

T] he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution

"Our Constitution divided the `powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.'"

—distinguishing between action of a single chamber of Congress and binding legislation passed by "a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure

The pragmatism of delegation to administrative agencies of complex procedures, is balanced against the responsibility of the courts to assure compliance with law.

We've held that the Constitution's specification of a "single, finely wrought" procedure for the enactment of statutes (bicameralism and presentment) necessarily implies that Congress cannot amend an enacted statute without following that procedure—say, by allowing a single House to change what the law requires

Yes, the one-house legislative veto is unconstitutional because any action by Congress that has the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch must be achieved through the full legislative process. The Court's reasoning is that the action of the House under § 244(c)(2) was legislative in character, as it effectively overruled the Attorney General's decision and mandated Chadha's deportation. The Constitution explicitly requires that all legislative acts must satisfy the principles of bicameralism (passage by both the House and Senate) and presentment (submission to the President for signature or veto), as prescribed in Article I, § 7. The one-house veto fails on both counts, as it involves action by a single house and bypasses the President entirely. The Framers created this carefully wrought, deliberate process to serve as a check on legislative power and protect the people from improvident laws, and considerations of efficiency or convenience cannot justify circumventing these explicit constitutional requirements.

Yes, the House's action is unconstitutional, but on narrower grounds. When Congress, by a simple resolution, found that Chadha did not meet the statutory criteria for suspension of deportation, it assumed a judicial function in violation of the separation of powers. Instead of prescribing a general rule, the House adjudicated the rights of a specific individual, a role properly entrusted to the judicial or executive branch. This 'trial by legislature' lacks the procedural safeguards of a court or agency and raises the danger of unchecked power and arbitrary decision-making that the Framers sought to prevent. This approach avoids the broader question of whether all legislative vetoes are invalid under the Presentment Clauses.

No, the legislative veto is a constitutional and indispensable political invention that allows Congress to delegate necessary authority to the executive branch while retaining a crucial check on that power. The Court's formalistic reading of Article I ignores the realities of the modern administrative state. The legislative veto is not an act of original lawmaking; rather, it is an exercise of a power reserved by Congress in the initial, duly enacted statute that delegated authority to the Attorney General. A change in the alien's legal status only occurs upon the concurrence of the House, Senate, and the President (acting through the Attorney General); the veto merely maintains the status quo. To strike down this mechanism, used in nearly 200 statutes, creates a Hobson's choice for Congress: either abdicate its lawmaking function to unelected agencies or fail to delegate authority needed to solve complex national problems.

The Court should not have reached the constitutional question because the one-house veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is not severable from the rest of the statute. The legislative history clearly shows that Congress was unwilling to give the Attorney General the final authority to suspend deportations and consistently insisted on retaining ultimate control. By invalidating the veto provision while leaving the Attorney General's suspension authority intact, the Court has created a law that Congress never intended to enact. The proper result of finding the veto unconstitutional should be to invalidate the entire suspension-of-deportation scheme, meaning Chadha would be deported.

Yes, the one-House legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional because it violates the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I of the Constitution. These requirements were intended as essential constitutional checks on each branch of government. By allowing one House of Congress to overturn a decision of the Executive Branch that was made pursuant to authority delegated to it by Congress, § 244(c)(2) essentially allows one House to enact legislation without abiding by the bicameralism and presentment requirements. The fact that the veto is convenient or efficient does not override these constitutional requirements. The Constitution does not authorize either the Executive or the Legislative Branch to have complete control over the regulation of aliens, and the Court has a duty to enforce the explicit procedures of Article I when one branch purports to use powers that are central to another branch.

I dissent because the Court's decision is far too broad and fails to account for the important role the legislative veto has played in our constitutional system for the past 50 years. The legislative veto is a useful political invention that allows the Executive and Legislative Branches to resolve major constitutional and policy differences, and it does not violate the separation of powers when it is authorized by statute. Congress has included the legislative veto in numerous statutes dating back to the 1930s, and the Executive has accepted it as the price for receiving broad delegations of authority from Congress. The Court should not strike down the legislative veto in all its forms, in hundreds of statutes, based on the atypical example presented by this case.

I concur in the judgment that the legislative veto in this case is unconstitutional, but on narrower grounds than the majority. When Congress decides whether a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country, it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the separation of powers. Congress did not enact a general rule, but rather determined that six specific individuals, including Chadha, did not comply with statutory criteria. It did this without providing the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or administrative agency adjudicates individual rights. I would not reach the broader question of whether all legislative vetoes are unconstitutional under the Presentment Clauses.

Yes, the one-House legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional because it violates the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I of the Constitution. These requirements were intended as essential constitutional checks on each branch of government. By allowing one House of Congress to overturn a decision of the Executive Branch that was made pursuant to authority delegated to it by Congress, § 244(c)(2) essentially allows one House to enact legislation without abiding by the bicameralism and presentment requirements. The fact that the veto is convenient or efficient does not override these constitutional requirements. The Constitution does not authorize either the Executive or the Legislative Branch to have complete control over the regulation of aliens, and we have a duty to enforce the explicit procedures of Article I when one branch purports to use powers that are central to another branch.

No, the one-House legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is not unconstitutional. I dissent because the Court's decision is far too broad and fails to account for the important role the legislative veto has played in our constitutional system for the past 50 years. The legislative veto is a useful political invention that allows the Executive and Legislative Branches to resolve major constitutional and policy differences, and it does not violate the separation of powers when it is authorized by statute. Congress has included the legislative veto in numerous statutes dating back to the 1930s, and the Executive has accepted it as the price for receiving broad delegations of authority from Congress. We should not strike down the legislative veto in all its forms, in hundreds of statutes, based on the atypical example presented by this case.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision, which I believe misinterprets the constitutional balance of powers and unduly restricts the legislative authority granted by the Constitution. The majority holds that the one-House legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, asserting that it violates the bicameralism and presentment clauses of Article I. However, this interpretation overlooks the practical necessities of modern governance and the flexibility that the Framers intended to afford the legislative process. The legislative veto is a vital tool that allows for efficient legislative oversight of executive actions, ensuring that such actions remain aligned with the legislative intent and public interest without the cumbersome process of passing new legislation. By striking down this provision, the Court not only undermines the pragmatic balance that the legislative veto seeks to achieve but also potentially hampers the ability of Congress to respond swiftly to changing policy needs. The Constitution does not demand rigid adherence to the bicameralism and presentment process in all instances of legislative action, particularly where, as here, the action in question involves a check on delegated authority rather than the enactment of new law. Therefore, I would argue that the legislative veto as employed in § 244(c)(2) falls within an acceptable use of legislative power that does not contravene the explicit provisions or the spirit of the Constitution.

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha

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