Illinois v. Somerville
410 U.S. 458 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar the retrial of a defendant when a mistrial is declared over the defendant's objection if the mistrial was based on a "manifest necessity," such as a fatal jurisdictional defect in the indictment that was not curable under state law and would have made any resulting conviction automatically reversible on appeal.
Facts:
- On March 19, 1964, an Illinois grand jury indicted respondent Somerville for the crime of theft.
- Somerville's trial began, and a jury was empaneled and sworn on November 1, 1965.
- The following day, before any evidence was presented, the prosecuting attorney discovered that the indictment was fatally deficient under Illinois law.
- The indictment failed to allege that Somerville intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property, which was a necessary element of the crime of theft.
- Under Illinois law at the time, this substantive defect was considered "jurisdictional," could not be cured by amendment, and could be used to overturn a conviction at any time, even after a final judgment.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondent Somerville was brought to trial in an Illinois state court. After the jury was sworn, the trial judge granted the State's motion for a mistrial over Somerville's objection.
- The grand jury returned a second, valid indictment.
- At a second trial in the same Illinois court, Somerville's claim of double jeopardy was overruled, and a jury convicted him.
- The Illinois appellate courts affirmed the conviction.
- Somerville filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which was denied.
- Somerville appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which initially affirmed the denial of his petition.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of recent precedent.
- On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed its prior holding and ruled that the retrial had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, ordering that the writ of habeas corpus be granted.
- The State of Illinois petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar a state from retrying a defendant after the trial judge, over the defendant's objection, declared a mistrial because the indictment was fatally defective under state law and could not be amended?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial in this instance because the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. The standard for allowing a retrial after a mistrial declared over a defendant's objection is whether there was a "manifest necessity" for the act, or if the "ends of public justice" would otherwise be defeated, a flexible standard established in United States v. Perez. A trial judge properly exercises discretion to declare a mistrial if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error. Here, the indictment had a fatal, non-amendable defect under state law, meaning any conviction would have been automatically reversed. Forcing the parties to complete a trial doomed to reversal would not serve the ends of public justice and would waste time and resources. This situation, arising from a procedural dead end, is distinct from cases like Downum v. United States, where a mistrial was improperly declared due to prosecutorial unpreparedness. A defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must sometimes be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
Yes. Retrial should be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn, and Somerville had a valued right to have his trial completed by that particular tribunal. This case is controlled by Downum and United States v. Jorn, which hold that prosecutorial error is not a sufficient basis to declare a mistrial over a defendant's objection. The mistrial was occasioned by the State's error in drafting the indictment. The majority's analysis improperly prioritizes the State's interest in securing a conviction and avoiding a wasted trial over the defendant's constitutional rights. Crucially, this reasoning ignores the possibility that the defendant might have been acquitted by the first jury, thereby ending the dispute entirely.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. Retrial should be barred. The majority abandons the clearer guidance of Jorn and Downum for a vague balancing test that improperly weighs the interests at stake. The trial judge had viable alternatives to declaring a mistrial. He could have proceeded with the trial, as it was not an absolute certainty that Illinois appellate courts would reverse a conviction, especially if faced with the constitutional implications of their rigid pleading rules. More importantly, even if reversal were guaranteed, the trial should have continued because the defendant could have been acquitted, which would have barred any retrial. To assume a trial is useless is to assume conviction is inevitable, which is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. The cause of the mistrial was prosecutorial negligence, which Downum found insufficient to constitute manifest necessity.
Analysis:
This decision refines the "manifest necessity" doctrine, establishing that a fatal, incurable procedural defect in an indictment that guarantees reversal on appeal is a sufficient reason to declare a mistrial and permit retrial. It represents a pragmatic approach that prioritizes judicial economy and the public's interest in obtaining a final, just judgment over a defendant's interest in proceeding with a potentially flawed trial. The ruling distinguishes between mistrials caused by correctable prosecutorial unpreparedness (as in Downum) and those stemming from a state's rigid procedural rules, granting more deference to a trial judge's discretion in the latter scenario. The case thus narrows the scope of double jeopardy protection where the first trial is aborted not for tactical advantage, but to cure a fundamental legal error.
