ILLINOIS RESTAURANT ASS'N v. City of Chicago
2007 WL 1765007, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42760, 492 F.Supp.2d 891 (2007)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance that bans the sale of a product produced entirely out-of-state does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause if the law is non-discriminatory in its terms and practical effect, meaning it does not favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests.
Facts:
- On April 26, 2006, the City of Chicago enacted an ordinance banning the sale of foie gras at 'food dispensing establishments' within the city.
- Foie gras is a food product made from the fattened liver of a duck or goose, created through a force-feeding process called gavage.
- The City Council passed the ordinance based on the belief that the production of foie gras is inhumane and that a ban would enhance the reputation of Chicago's restaurants.
- Foie gras is not produced in the City of Chicago or anywhere in the state of Illinois.
- All foie gras sold in Chicago is produced either in other U.S. states, such as California and New York, or imported from foreign countries like Canada and France.
- The Illinois Restaurant Association and Allen’s New American Café are plaintiffs who wished to continue selling dishes containing foie gras to their customers.
Procedural Posture:
- The Illinois Restaurant Association and Allen’s New American Café filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago in Illinois state court.
- The initial complaint alleged the ordinance exceeded the City's home rule powers under the Illinois Constitution.
- The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim that the ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
- The City of Chicago removed the case from state court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The City of Chicago filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance banning the sale of foie gras, a product not produced within the municipality or state, violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution when the ordinance confers no competitive advantage to any local economic interest?
Opinions:
Majority - Manning, District Judge
No, the ordinance does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. A non-discriminatory local law that has incidental effects on interstate commerce does not trigger the Pike balancing test where the law provides no competitive advantage to local businesses. First, the court held the ordinance was a valid exercise of Chicago’s home rule power under the Illinois Constitution, as it addressed the local issue of what products could be sold within the city and was based on the City Council's perception of public morals. Second, the court analyzed the ordinance under the dormant Commerce Clause's two-tier framework. It found the ordinance was not discriminatory because it did not directly regulate out-of-state conduct and did not favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state ones; in fact, there were no in-state interests to favor. Citing Seventh Circuit precedent in National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, the court concluded that because the ordinance had 'no disparate treatment, no disparate impact,' the Pike balancing test was not required. The Commerce Clause protects the interstate market from protectionism, not particular firms from local regulations that result in lost sales.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that the dormant Commerce Clause is primarily a tool against economic protectionism, not a general check on the wisdom of local regulations. By finding the Pike balancing test inapplicable to a non-discriminatory law with no in-state commercial equivalent to the banned product, the court narrows the scope of dormant Commerce Clause challenges. This precedent provides significant leeway for municipalities to enact laws based on public health, safety, or morals, even if those laws exclusively impact out-of-state producers. The ruling suggests that as long as a regulation does not create a competitive advantage for local industry, the economic burden it places on interstate firms is not, by itself, a constitutional violation.
