No, the search was legal. The Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects people from 'unreasonable' searches, not from honest mistakes by the police. Based on what the police knew at the time—Fischer had a key, called it 'our' apartment, and said her stuff was inside—it was reasonable for them to believe she could let them in. As long as the police acted reasonably, the search is okay, even if they were mistaken about her living there.

Yes, the search was illegal. The only way someone else can give permission to search your home is if you've given them shared control, which means you've accepted the risk that they might let someone in. Since Fischer had moved out, Rodriguez hadn't given her that control, so his privacy was fully protected. The police being mistaken doesn't change that. They should have just gotten a warrant from a judge instead of taking a shortcut.

Usually, police can't go into someone's home without a warrant. But they can if the person who lives there, or someone else in charge of the place, says it's okay. The important question is, based on what the police knew in the moment, would a careful person reasonably think the person giving permission was allowed to do that? If yes, then the search is okay. The Court is sending the case back to figure out if the police reasonably believed Fischer could let them in.

Searches are only reasonable if the person who gives permission is actually allowed to do that. If the person doesn't really have the authority, it doesn't matter if the police thought they did - the homeowner's privacy is still violated. Police shouldn't search homes without warrants unless there's an emergency. The majority is ignoring people's right to expect privacy in their homes and creating a new exception to the warrant rule without thinking about whether police really need it.

Yes, I hold that a warrantless search follows the Constitution when, at the time of the search, a careful person would reasonably believe that the person giving permission had the authority to consent—even if it later turns out that the person was not truly authorized. I recognize that police usually need a warrant to enter a home, but if someone who appears to be in charge says it’s okay, then the search is allowed. I send the case back to determine if the officers had a reasonable basis for believing that Fischer possessed the required authority.

No, I hold that the search does not follow the Constitution when the person giving permission does not truly have the authority to do so. Even if the police believed the person had authority, a search conducted under such mistaken consent violates the homeowner’s privacy. I maintain that police should not enter a home without a warrant unless there is an emergency. I dissent from the majority’s approach, which I believe improperly creates a new exception to the warrant requirement.

—warrantless entry is valid when based on consent of a third party whom police, at the time of entry, reasonably believed to possess common authority over premises but who in fact does not

In addition to consent given by the defendant or a person with common authority over the premises, both the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized that the voluntary consent exception can be satisfied (and a search can be deemed reasonable) when a police officer reasonably but mistakenly believed that a third party who had consented to a …

A third party's consent to search is valid if that person has either the "actual authority" or the "apparent authority" to consent to a search of that property.

A warrantless search premised on an officer's reasonable belief that the consenting party had authority to consent to the search of the premises is lawful.

Apparent authority is `judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises

The fourth amendment's prohibition against the warrantless entry of a person's home does not apply to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained either from the individual whose property is searched or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises.

"The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects."

Apparent authority to consent to a search exists "when the facts available to an officer at the time of a search would allow a person of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises." Id

"[I] n order to satisfy the `reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. "

The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.

No. A warrantless entry based on the consent of a third party whom police reasonably believe to have common authority does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if that belief is mistaken. The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable' searches, not all factual errors made by law enforcement. The critical inquiry is whether the police officers' judgment was reasonable, not whether it was correct. This standard of reasonableness has been applied to other factual determinations police must make, such as those supporting probable cause for a warrant or identifying a suspect for arrest. Therefore, if the facts available to the officers at the moment would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises, the search is valid.

Yes. A warrantless entry based on a third party's consent is unconstitutional if that party lacks actual authority, regardless of the police's reasonable belief. The validity of third-party consent searches rests on the premise that a defendant has voluntarily limited their expectation of privacy by granting another person joint access and control. If no such authority has been granted, the defendant's expectation of privacy remains fully intact, and the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies. The majority incorrectly creates a new exception to the warrant requirement based on a free-floating standard of 'reasonableness' rather than on the defendant's assumption of risk, thereby eroding the strong protections afforded to the home.

The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless entry into a person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects. However, this prohibition does not apply where voluntary consent has been obtained from the individual whose property is searched or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. How would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority? If so, the search is valid. The Court remands for consideration of whether the officers reasonably believed Fischer had the authority to consent.

Consent searches are reasonable only to the extent that they are based on consent by a party empowered to give it. A defendant's expectation of privacy is not diminished where the third party lacks actual authority to consent, even if the police reasonably believed the third party had such authority. Warrantless home searches and seizures are unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. The majority ignores the legitimate expectations of privacy upon which individuals are entitled to rely and creates an additional exception to the warrant requirement without considering whether the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.

No, I hold that a warrantless entry and search does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it is based on the consent of a third party, provided the facts available at the time justify a reasonable belief that the consenting party possesses common authority over the premises. I note that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless entry into a person's home for the purposes of arrest or search, this prohibition does not apply when valid, voluntary consent is obtained either from the resident or from another individual with common authority. Accordingly, if the facts compel a person of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority, the search is valid. I therefore remand the case for further consideration of whether my findings support the conclusion that I was justified in concluding that Fischer possessed the requisite authority to consent.

Yes, I hold that a warrantless entry and search violates the Fourth Amendment when it is based on the consent of a party who is not empowered to give it—even if the officers reasonably believe otherwise. I maintain that consent searches are only reasonable when founded on valid consent from an authorized party, and a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not compromised by the mistaken authority of a third party. Absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless home search is unreasonable. I dissent from the majority’s opinion, which, in my view, improperly expands the consent exception to the warrant requirement without sufficient regard for the established privacy expectations individuals are entitled to.

Illinois v. Rodriguez

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