IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez

Supreme Court of the United States
163 L. Ed. 2d 288, 546 U.S. 21, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 8373 (2005)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Activities that are 'integral and indispensable' to an employee's principal activities are themselves considered 'principal activities' under the Portal-to-Portal Act, making associated walking time during the continuous workday compensable under the FLSA, but pre-shift waiting time to don protective gear is a non-compensable preliminary activity.


Facts:

  • IBP, Inc. operates a meat processing plant where production workers are required to wear extensive protective gear, much of which is unique to their jobs and must be donned in company locker rooms.
  • IBP's pay system for production workers begins when they start cutting and bagging meat, though the company began providing four minutes of paid clothes-changing time in 1998.
  • Barber Foods, Inc. operates a poultry processing plant where employees are required to wear various protective clothing.
  • Barber's employees are paid from the moment they punch into computerized timeclocks located at the entrances to the production floor.

Procedural Posture:

  • Employees of IBP, Inc. filed a class action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, alleging the company failed to compensate them for certain pre- and post-production activities.
  • The District Court ruled that the donning and doffing of unique protective gear, and the walking time between locker rooms and the production floor for these employees, were compensable under the FLSA.
  • IBP, Inc. appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, agreeing that donning and doffing of unique protective gear were "principal activities" and the associated walking time was compensable.
  • Employees of Barber Foods, Inc. brought an action in the District Court for Maine, claiming uncompensated time for donning and doffing protective gear, and related walking and waiting.
  • The District Court granted partial summary judgment for Barber Foods, holding that required donning and doffing was compensable but rejecting claims for predonning waiting time and certain walking time to/from work areas.
  • Following a jury trial, the jury found for Barber Foods on all counts, concluding that the actual donning and doffing time was de minimis.
  • The Barber Foods employees appealed (as petitioners) to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which held that both the walking time between changing areas and production floors and the waiting time before donning gear were preliminary or postliminary activities and thus excluded from FLSA coverage by the Portal-to-Portal Act.
  • The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit (IBP case) and the First Circuit (Barber Foods case) regarding the compensability of these activities.

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Issue:

Does the Portal-to-Portal Act exclude from FLSA coverage (1) the time employees spend walking between an area where they don required protective gear and the production area, and (2) the time employees spend waiting to put on such gear, when the donning of that gear is deemed an 'integral and indispensable' part of their principal activities?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stevens

No, the Portal-to-Portal Act does not exclude the walking time between donning integral and indispensable gear and the production area. Yes, the Act does exclude the time employees spend waiting to don such gear before the workday begins. The Court held that activities deemed "integral and indispensable" to an employee's principal activities, such as donning unique protective gear, are themselves considered "principal activities" for the purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act, citing Steiner v. Mitchell. Consequently, the "continuous workday" commences with the performance of this first principal activity. Walking time that occurs after this initial principal activity has begun, but before the last principal activity ceases, falls within the continuous workday and is thus compensable under the FLSA, as it is not excluded by § 4(a)(1) which applies only to travel to and from the first principal activity. The Court noted that the legislative purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act was to repudiate Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.'s holding that pre-work walking was compensable, not to exclude walking time within a continuous workday. Department of Labor regulations, specifically the continuous workday rule (29 CFR § 790.6(a), (b)), support this interpretation. However, the Court distinguished pre-donning waiting time, holding that it is a "preliminary activity" explicitly excluded by § 4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act because it occurs before the commencement of the first principal activity. Unlike the donning itself, waiting may not be necessary in every situation and is not "integral and indispensable" in the same sense, nor would including it as a principal activity align with the Act's intent to exclude activities like the pre-work walking found compensable in Anderson. The Court clarified that its analysis of waiting time would differ if the employer mandated employees' arrival at a specific time solely for waiting.



Analysis:

This decision clarifies the scope of "principal activities" under the Portal-to-Portal Act, distinguishing between activities that initiate the "continuous workday" and those that are genuinely "preliminary." By affirming that "integral and indispensable" activities are principal activities, the Court ensures employers cannot avoid FLSA liability for tasks essential to job performance simply by separating them from direct production. However, the ruling also draws a clear line, preventing potentially expansive liability for passive pre-shift waiting, reinforcing the Portal-to-Portal Act's original intent to limit FLSA's reach compared to prior judicial interpretations. This impacts industries requiring extensive protective gear, compelling employers to integrate essential donning/doffing into paid time and potentially adjust start times to mitigate uncompensated waiting.

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