Iandiorio v. Kriss & Senko Enterprises, Inc.
517 A.2d 580, 512 Pa. 392, 517 A.2d 530 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
An employer may be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for an employee's negligent personal act if the employer had knowledge of the activity and exerted sufficient control over where and when such personal acts were to occur, thereby bringing the act within the scope of employment.
Facts:
- Ciro A. Iandiorio began working as a gasoline station attendant for Robinson Petroleum Company in the spring of 1979.
- In June 1979, Kriss and Senko Enterprises, Inc. was contracted to renovate the gas station into a convenience store, during which the full-service pumps were shut down.
- On June 25, 1979, Iandiorio spilled gasoline onto the thigh area of his right leg while attempting to fix a malfunctioning self-service pump nozzle.
- Iandiorio then entered the station building where he observed William Simon, an employee of Kriss and Senko, and Michael Simon, an independent contractor, taking a coffee break.
- Iandiorio advised both Simon brothers of the presence of gasoline upon his clothing.
- Despite actual knowledge of the gasoline, William Simon proceeded to light a cigarette a few feet away from Iandiorio, causing Iandiorio's clothing to ignite and seriously burn him.
- The incident occurred during William Simon's scheduled working hours.
- Kriss and Senko Enterprises, Inc. knew its employees smoked on the job and, recognizing the hazards of smoking near gasoline, ordered its employees to take their coffee breaks and smoke inside the building where the accident occurred.
Procedural Posture:
- Ciro A. Iandiorio (appellant) sued Kriss and Senko Enterprises, Inc. (appellee) in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court).
- At the close of Iandiorio's case on liability, the trial court granted Kriss and Senko's motion for a compulsory nonsuit.
- Iandiorio's motion to strike the nonsuit was denied by the trial court en banc.
- Iandiorio appealed the denial to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (intermediate appellate court).
- A three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed the denial of the motion to strike the nonsuit.
- Iandiorio filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (highest court).
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Issue:
Does an employer's instruction to employees to take personal breaks and smoke in a specific area of a job site constitute sufficient control over the employees' personal acts to bring a negligent act of smoking within the scope of employment for purposes of respondeat superior liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Larsen, Justice
Yes, an employer's instruction to employees to take personal breaks and smoke in a specific area of a job site can constitute sufficient control to bring a negligent act of smoking within the scope of employment for purposes of respondeat superior liability. The court relied on Comment c. to Section 229 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which distinguishes between acts merely permitted for personal convenience and those where the master assumes control over the general conduct of the servant during such periods. The trial court's error was in ruling, as a matter of law, that any personal act like smoking is outside the scope of employment, thereby taking the issue of employer control from the jury. The employer, Kriss and Senko, not only knew its employees smoked but also dictated where they should take breaks and smoke, specifically ordering them to smoke inside the building due to the hazards near gasoline. This active control over the location of a personal act like smoking, especially when related to safety concerns, is sufficient to bring the employee's action within the scope of employment, unlike in Herr v. Simplex Paper Box Corporation where the employer lacked knowledge and control. When facts are disputed or allow for more than one inference, the question of whether an employee acted within the scope of employment is a matter for the jury to decide.
Dissenting - Nix, Chief Justice
No, an employer's direction to employees to smoke in a specific area to avoid hazards does not expand liability for all negligent acts of smoking beyond the scope of employment, as the act of smoking itself is not for the purpose of serving the master. Justice Nix agreed with Justice Flaherty's dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority's reasoning is overly simplistic and would deter employers from taking extra safety precautions. The employer's control was specifically to prevent smoking near the gas pumps, which was achieved. The act of smoking is a personal convenience, not for the purpose of serving the master, as outlined in Section 235 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Merely giving a direction about where to perform a personal act does not provide a basis to expand an employer's liability for actions clearly beyond the scope of employment, especially when the directive was aimed at preventing a different type of harm.
Dissenting - Flaherty, Justice
No, an employer is not vicariously liable for injuries caused by an employee's personal act of smoking, even if directed to smoke in a specific area, because smoking is not 'part of the work' and is solely for the employee's personal convenience. Justice Flaherty argued that smoking is an activity unrelated to the work of remodeling a service station and is permitted solely for the personal convenience of the employees. Citing Section 229, Comment c, and Sections 228 and 235 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, he asserted that conduct is within the scope of employment only if it is the kind of work the employee is hired to perform and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. Lighting a cigarette while on a break does not meet these criteria. He maintained that the case is governed by Herr v. Simplex Paper Box Corporation, which held an employer not liable for an employee's negligent smoking because it was not connected to the employer's business, even when the employee was performing a work-related task. The employer's directive regarding where to smoke was a safety measure, not an assumption of control over the purpose of the act itself.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of respondeat superior to employee personal acts, particularly when an employer imposes safety regulations on those acts. It distinguishes between merely permitting a personal act and actively controlling its location or execution, suggesting that safety directives can transform a purely personal activity into one deemed 'within the scope of employment' if sufficient control is exercised. The ruling underscores the jury's vital role in determining the 'scope of employment' when facts concerning employer knowledge and control are open to different interpretations. This decision implies a potentially broader interpretation of employer liability, particularly when employers implement rules governing employee conduct, even for personal activities, in response to workplace hazards.
