Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell
425 U.S. 610, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 149 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance that regulates First Amendment activities like door-to-door canvassing must be drawn with narrow specificity, clearly defining who is covered and what is required for compliance, to avoid being unconstitutionally void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause.
Facts:
- The Borough of Oradell, New Jersey, enacted Ordinance No. 598A to regulate door-to-door canvassing.
- The ordinance required any person desiring to canvass for a 'recognized charitable cause' or a 'political campaign or cause' to first notify the police department in writing 'for identification only.'
- The ordinance also covered 'Borough Civic Groups and Organizations.'
- Edward Hynes was a New Jersey state assemblyman whose electoral district was redrawn to include Oradell.
- Hynes wished to campaign door-to-door in Oradell for his re-election.
- Three other Oradell registered voters wished to either canvass door-to-door for various political causes or to receive information from candidates campaigning in the borough.
- These individuals claimed that the ordinance would unconstitutionally restrict their political speech and associational activities.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward Hynes and three Oradell voters sued the Borough of Oradell in the Superior Court of Bergen County, N.J. (a trial court), seeking to declare Ordinance No. 598A unconstitutional.
- The Superior Court held the ordinance invalid, finding it, among other things, to be vague and overbroad.
- The borough appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court (an intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the trial court's decision but solely on the ground that the ordinance was unenforceable because it lacked a penalty clause.
- The borough appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey (the state's highest court), which reversed, finding the ordinance to be a constitutional exercise of police power.
- Hynes and the other plaintiffs (appellants) then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that requires individuals canvassing door-to-door for political or charitable causes to provide advance written notice to the police for identification purposes, without clearly defining the scope of covered causes or the specific information required for identification, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
Yes, a municipal ordinance that requires individuals canvassing for political or charitable causes to provide written notice to the police without clearly defining its scope or compliance requirements violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague. While a municipality has the power to regulate canvassing to protect its citizens from crime and annoyance, any such regulation must be narrowly and precisely drawn, especially when First Amendment rights are implicated. This ordinance is fatally vague in two respects: first, its coverage is unclear because terms like 'recognized charitable cause,' 'political ... cause,' and 'Borough Civic Groups and Organizations' are undefined, forcing individuals to guess at their meaning. Second, the ordinance fails to specify what information must be provided for 'identification,' which gives police the effective, unbridled power to grant or deny permission to canvass, a practice condemned in prior cases such as Lovell v. Griffin and Schneider v. State.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes, the ordinance is impermissibly vague, but even a precisely drafted identification requirement for political canvassing would present substantial First Amendment problems. An identification requirement inherently discourages free speech by destroying the anonymity that has historically been crucial for the expression of controversial or unpopular ideas, as established in Talley v. California. This chilling effect is particularly harmful to political expression, the core of the First Amendment, which relies heavily on volunteer participation that may be deterred by such requirements. The government's asserted interest in crime prevention is not self-evident enough to justify this significant burden on protected speech without a more substantial showing of necessity and effectiveness.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No, the ordinance is a constitutional exercise of municipal police power and is not impermissibly vague. The Court's precedent recognizes that municipalities may require identification from canvassers for crime prevention purposes. The appellants, who are political canvassers, clearly fall within the ordinance's scope and lack standing to challenge its alleged vagueness as it might apply to charitable or civic groups. The compliance requirement—to 'notify the Police Department, in writing, for identification only'—is sufficiently clear. If a canvasser is uncertain about what constitutes adequate identification, they can simply ask the police, and this minimal burden does not rise to a constitutional violation. Since the New Jersey Supreme Court held that no official has the discretion to deny the privilege of canvassing, the majority's fear of arbitrary enforcement is unfounded.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to laws that regulate speech, requiring a heightened level of precision. By striking down the ordinance for its ambiguous terms and compliance standards, the Court created a strong precedent that even minimal notice and identification requirements for canvassers must be explicitly and narrowly defined. The ruling serves as a caution to municipalities that any regulation touching upon core political speech will face strict scrutiny. The case left open the ultimate constitutionality of a precisely drafted identification ordinance but signaled that such laws would be difficult to justify against a First Amendment challenge.
