Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.
518 N.Y.S.2d 996, 136 Misc. 2d 482, 1987 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2476 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A state legislature may constitutionally enact a revival statute to extend or reinstate time-barred personal injury claims for latent injuries caused by toxic substances, provided there is a rational basis for the classification and it promotes a legitimate state interest in public health and welfare.
Facts:
- Mindy Hymdwitz's mother took diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic estrogen, in 1954 during pregnancy to prevent a possible miscarriage.
- Mindy Hymdwitz was born on December 11, 1954.
- Mindy Hymdwitz allegedly developed a cancerous condition in 1979 due to prenatal DES exposure.
- Under the Statute of Limitations then applicable (CPLR 208, 214), Mindy Hymdwitz would have been barred from commencing suit in December 1975 (three years after reaching the age of majority).
- In 1986, the New York Legislature enacted a revival statute (L 1986, ch 682, § 4) allowing actions for personal injury caused by the latent effects of exposure to five specified substances, including DES, that were time-barred or dismissed, to be instituted 'within one year from the effective date of this act'.
- The 1986 tort reform legislation also adopted a general discovery-based Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214-c [2]) for injuries caused by latent effects of exposure to any substance, allowing a victim to assert a cause of action within three years from the date the injury was or should have been discovered.
Procedural Posture:
- Mindy Hymdwitz commenced a pharmaceutical product liability action in the Supreme Court, New York County, alleging cancer from prenatal DES exposure under the 1986 revival statute.
- Mindy Hymdwitz moved pursuant to CPLR 3212 to strike affirmative defenses raised by some defendants (Eli Lilly and Co., Abbott Laboratories, The Upjohn Company, and E. R. Squibb & Sons) challenging the constitutionality of the revival statute and alleging the action was time-barred.
- Defendants Eli Lilly and Co., Abbott Laboratories, and The Upjohn Company sought summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint, arguing the action was time-barred absent the allegedly unconstitutional revival statute.
- Defendant E. R. Squibb & Sons opposed plaintiff's motion, contending that further discovery was needed before determining the statute's constitutionality and to determine whether plaintiff could identify the manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother.
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Issue:
Is a state legislative revival statute, which allows certain time-barred latent injury claims based on exposure to specific toxic substances to be reinstituted, unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by arbitrarily depriving defendants of their right to rely on the expiration of the statute of limitations and by singling out particular substances?
Opinions:
Majority - Ira Gammerman, J.
No, the state legislative revival statute is not unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as it promotes a legitimate state interest in public health and welfare by providing a remedy for latent injuries and has a rational basis for its classifications. The court reasoned that Statutes of Limitation represent a public policy statement with respect to the privilege to litigate, and their expiration suspends the court’s power to grant a remedy rather than destroying a fundamental right. New York courts have consistently upheld the Legislature's power to extend or revive time-barred claims under exceptional circumstances to prevent serious injustice, citing precedents such as Gallewski v Hentz & Co. (1950), Matter of McCann v Walsh Constr. Co. (1954), and In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (1984). The Legislature, in enacting the revival statute, acted within permissible objectives related to health, safety, and welfare by remedying the inequity where victims of latent injuries might be time-barred before becoming aware of their injuries. The court applied a rational basis review for the Due Process challenge, finding a reasonable connection between the statute and a legitimate state interest. Similarly, for the Equal Protection challenge, the court applied a rational basis standard of review, as the statute did not classify on the basis of a suspect class or impair a fundamental right. The classification, which targeted five specific substances for revival (including DES) while implementing a general discovery-based statute for others, was found to be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Legislative history indicated that these five substances were distinguished based on the existence of an identifiable group of affected individuals, allowing for a more predictable estimation of future costs. The court affirmed that the Legislature is permitted to address parts of a problem sequentially and is not required to act with mathematical or scientific exactitude, or to achieve perfect equity in its classifications, as long as a rational basis exists.
Analysis:
This case significantly affirms the broad authority of state legislatures to enact remedial statutes that can retroactively revive time-barred claims, particularly in areas of public health and latent injuries. By applying a deferential rational basis review to both due process and equal protection challenges, the court signals that it will largely respect legislative judgment in determining public policy, even when classifications are not scientifically precise or result in some inequity. The decision provides a crucial avenue for victims of long-latency diseases to seek legal recourse, reinforcing the idea that procedural bars like statutes of limitations can be modified to serve overarching justice concerns, thereby shaping the landscape for future toxic tort litigation.
