No, the President's firing was illegal because the law limiting his power is perfectly fine under the Constitution. The Court explained that the President can fire people who work directly for him in the executive branch. But the FTC is different; it's an 'independent agency' designed by Congress to be an impartial expert on business, almost like a special court. To do its job fairly, it can't be controlled by the President. If the President could fire its members anytime he disagreed with them, they wouldn't be independent. Therefore, Congress has the power to protect these officials from being fired for purely political reasons.

No, the President can't just fire an FTC member for any reason. The law is allowed to limit when the President can fire them because the FTC isn't part of the President's team. It helps make rules like Congress and makes decisions like a judge. Congress is allowed to make groups like this that are separate from the President and to say the President can only fire them for specific reasons. This makes sure the FTC can do its job fairly without the President controlling it.

No, we conclude that the President can't just fire an FTC member for any reason. The law is allowed to limit when the President can fire them because the FTC isn't part of the President's team. It helps make rules like Congress and makes decisions like a judge. Congress is allowed to make groups like this that are separate from the President and to say the President can only fire them for specific reasons. This makes sure the FTC can do its job fairly without the President controlling it.

I agree with the decision because the law says a Federal Trade Commissioner can only be fired for clear, specific reasons. This rule helps keep the Commission independent and fair. I differ a little from the majority because I put extra weight on the idea that a fixed term stops the President from firing someone just on a whim, which protects the Commission’s ability to work properly without extra political pressure.

—the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute forbidding the President from removing commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") except for "good cause."

After distinguishing "purely executive officers" from officers exercising "quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers," ibid., the Court held that "[w] hether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by... precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the office,"

The doctrine of separation of powers is designed to keep "each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others."

—found that the Federal Trade Commission was "charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative."

—the President may remove the Bureau's director only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."

I] t is quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will

—the Court described as a "body of experts" that operates "independent of executive authority... and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official,"

As a landmark decision involving the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) made clear, however, when Congress grants rulemaking and adjudicative authority to an expert agency composed of commissioners selected through a bipartisan procedure and appointed for fixed terms, it substantially insulates the agency from executive control.

Instead, it represents the administrative prerogative of a President to remove an executive officer who holds views diverging from his own.

Whether a particular function falls within this class or within the far larger class that may be relegated to independent officers "will depend upon the character of the office."

No, the Federal Trade Commission Act's limitation on the President's removal power is constitutional. The President’s power to remove an officer depends on the character of the office. The Court distinguished this case from Myers v. United States, which affirmed the President's illimitable power to remove purely executive officers like a postmaster. The Federal Trade Commission, however, is not a purely executive agency; it is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies. It performs duties that are predominantly quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial, acting as an independent body of experts. The legislative history of the FTC Act demonstrates that Congress intended the commission to be independent of executive control to ensure impartial administration. An unrestricted removal power would threaten this independence and undermine the commission's purpose. Therefore, Congress may constitutionally insulate officers of such quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial bodies from at-will removal by the President.

No, the President does not have unlimited authority to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner. The FTC Act is constitutional in its restriction of the President's removal power to the causes enumerated in the statute because the FTC is not a purely executive agency, but an independent, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial body. The duties of the FTC are not purely executive in nature, as it also acts as a legislative aid in making investigations and reports to Congress and as a judicial aid when acting as a master in chancery. The authority of Congress to create such quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies and to require them to act independently of executive control includes the power to fix the terms of office and limit the executive's removal power. Allowing the President to remove FTC commissioners at will would threaten the independence of the commission and its ability to carry out its statutory duties free from executive influence or control.

I concur with the Court’s decision to answer both certified questions in the affirmative because the Federal Trade Commission Act clearly limits the President’s removal power to the causes enumerated, thereby preserving the independence and specialized functions of the Commission. While I join the majority in holding that a commissioner may only be removed for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, I differ from the majority by emphasizing that such statutory safeguards are vital not only to uphold legislative intent but also to prevent undue political interference. My concurrence stresses that a fixed term and specified grounds for removal are crucial because they maintain a balance between executive power and institutional independence, ensuring that the Commission can perform its quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial roles without the risk of arbitrary dismissal.

Humphrey's Executor v. United States

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