Humber v. Morton
426 S.W.2d 554 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
The sale of a new house by a builder-vendor includes an implied warranty that the house was constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and is suitable for human habitation, abrogating the common law doctrine of caveat emptor in this context.
Facts:
- Claude Morton was a 'builder-vendor' in the business of constructing houses on land he owned and then selling the completed homes to the public.
- In May 1964, Ernestine Humber purchased a new house from Morton.
- The deed of conveyance provided to Humber contained only a warranty of title.
- Morton had hired an independent contractor, Johnny F. Mays, to construct the fireplace and chimney in the house.
- The first time Humber lit a fire in the fireplace, the house caught fire due to a defectively constructed chimney.
- The fire caused significant damage, partially burning the house.
Procedural Posture:
- Ernestine Humber sued Claude Morton in district court (trial court).
- In the first trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Humber.
- Morton appealed to the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals (intermediate appellate court), which reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial due to an error in the damage issue submission.
- In the second proceeding at the trial court, Morton's motion for summary judgment was granted, and Humber's was denied.
- Humber appealed the summary judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Morton, holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied.
- Humber then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review of the appellate court's decision.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of caveat emptor apply to the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor, thereby precluding an implied warranty that the house is fit for human habitation?
Opinions:
Majority - Norvell, Justice
No. The doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor; instead, the law implies a warranty of habitability and workmanlike construction. The court reasoned that the traditional justification for caveat emptor, which assumes parties deal at arm's length with equal knowledge, is unrealistic in the context of a modern home sale. An ordinary purchaser lacks the expertise to discover latent defects in construction and must rely on the skill and expertise of the professional builder-vendor. The court analogized the sale of a new home to the sale of personal property, where implied warranties of fitness have long replaced caveat emptor. It concluded that applying the old rule is a denial of justice and that the builder who creates the risk and is in a better position to prevent defects should bear the loss. This implied warranty arises from the sale itself and is not extinguished by the delivery of the deed.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally shifted Texas law by abolishing the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') for the sale of new residential housing. It established a new cause of action for homebuyers against builder-vendors by creating an implied warranty of habitability and good workmanship. This ruling aligned real property law with modern consumer protection principles prevalent in tort and contract law for personal property, placing the risk of latent construction defects on the professional builder rather than the inexperienced buyer. The decision has had a profound impact, setting a precedent that has been widely adopted and influencing the development of residential construction law across the nation.
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