Human Rights Commission v. LaBrie, Inc.
668 A.2d 659 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A landlord's facially neutral housing policy, such as a two-person occupancy limit, constitutes intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) when there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that it was adopted as a pretext to continue a prior, explicitly discriminatory policy against a protected class.
Facts:
- In 1981, Linda and Ernest LaBrie purchased the Limehurst Mobile Home Park.
- In 1982, the LaBries changed the park's lease terms to explicitly prohibit children under 18 from residing in any mobile home unit.
- In August 1986, Scott and Luanne McCarthy bought a home in the park and received a letter from Linda LaBrie reminding them it was an "adult park" and they would be required to move if they had a child.
- After a 1989 change in Vermont law made it illegal to discriminate based on familial status, the LaBries replaced their 'adults-only' rule with a new, facially neutral two-person maximum occupancy limit per lot.
- On September 18, 1989, the McCarthys' son was born, making them a family of three.
- Upon the child's arrival, Linda LaBrie sent the McCarthys a letter demanding they vacate for violating the new two-person occupancy limit.
- The LaBries then repeatedly contacted the McCarthys, demanding they leave, and delayed the approval of a sale of the McCarthys' home to a new buyer.
- No new families with minor children moved into the park after the LaBries implemented the two-person limit, maintaining the park's adults-only status quo.
Procedural Posture:
- LaBrie, Inc. filed a complaint for eviction against the McCarthys in trial court.
- The McCarthys filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.
- The Human Rights Commission commenced an action in Washington Superior Court (a court of first instance) against LaBrie, Inc., Linda LaBrie, and Ernest LaBrie, alleging violations of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act.
- Following a trial, the superior court found for the Commission, concluding that the defendants' occupancy limit constituted both intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) and had a discriminatory effect (disparate impact).
- The superior court awarded the McCarthys damages for emotional distress, loss of civil rights, and punitive damages, and awarded the Commission civil penalties and attorney's fees.
- Defendants LaBrie, Inc., Linda LaBrie, and Ernest LaBrie (as appellants) appealed the superior court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Vermont.
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Issue:
Does a landlord's facially neutral two-person occupancy limit, implemented immediately after a law change prohibited discrimination against families with children and which replaced the landlord's prior explicit adults-only policy, constitute intentional discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Allen, CJ.
Yes. A landlord's facially neutral occupancy limit constitutes intentional discrimination when it is adopted as a pretext to continue a prior, explicitly discriminatory policy. Intentional discrimination can be proven through circumstantial evidence, without direct proof. Evidence of a discriminatory practice prior to a change in civil rights law, coupled with a post-legislation policy that maintains the pre-existing exclusionary status quo, is sufficient to infer an intent to continue the discrimination. Here, the LaBries' shift from an explicit 'adults-only' policy to a two-person limit immediately after the law changed to protect families, combined with their immediate enforcement against the McCarthys and the fact that no new families with children moved in, supports the trial court's finding that the new policy was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The defendants' asserted 'business necessity' defense regarding limited septic and water capacity was not credible and was correctly rejected as pretextual.
Analysis:
This decision is significant because it affirms that courts will look beyond the face of a housing policy to its history, timing, and effect to determine discriminatory intent under a disparate treatment theory. It establishes that landlords cannot escape liability by replacing an explicitly illegal rule with a seemingly neutral one that achieves the same discriminatory result. The case reinforces that a defendant's prior conduct and the practical outcome of a new policy serve as powerful circumstantial evidence of pretext, making it harder for landlords to mask discriminatory motives behind facially neutral business justifications.
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