Hughes v. Meade
453 S.W.2d 538 (1970)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The attorney-client privilege does not protect a client's identity when the attorney is retained merely to act as an agent or conduit for the delivery of physical evidence, as such an act does not constitute a professional legal service.
Facts:
- An unidentified person contacted and employed the petitioner, an attorney, to facilitate the return of a stolen IBM typewriter to the police.
- The stated goal of the employment was to return the property without involving the person who possessed it.
- Following the attorney's instructions, the person left the typewriter in a box on the attorney's front porch.
- The attorney made sure not to see the person who dropped off the box.
- The attorney then contacted the police, who came to his property and retrieved the typewriter.
- The attorney received payment for this service.
Procedural Posture:
- In the Fayette Circuit Court, during the criminal trial of a man named Williams for theft, the petitioner (an attorney) was called to testify as a witness.
- When asked on the stand to reveal the name of the individual who had hired him to return a stolen typewriter, the petitioner refused, citing attorney-client privilege.
- The trial court judge, N. Mitchell Meade, held the petitioner in contempt of court for his refusal to answer.
- The petitioner then filed an original proceeding in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, seeking a writ of prohibition to stop Judge Meade from enforcing the contempt ruling.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the attorney-client privilege protect an attorney from being compelled to disclose the identity of a person who retained him for the sole purpose of delivering stolen property to the police?
Opinions:
Majority - Clay, Commissioner
No. The attorney-client privilege does not protect the client's identity in this situation. The court reasoned that the privilege is an exception to the general duty to disclose information and must be strictly confined to its purpose, which is to encourage full disclosure from a client seeking legal advice. Generally, a client's identity is not a privileged communication. While there are exceptions where revealing the identity would effectively disclose a confidential communication, this case does not fall into that category. The court determined that the attorney was not rendering a legal service or acting in his professional capacity; instead, he was acting merely as an 'agent or conduit for the delivery of property.' Using an attorney as a shield to conceal transactions involving stolen property is beyond the scope of the privilege.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a significant limitation on the scope of the attorney-client privilege by distinguishing between professional legal services and non-legal acts. It establishes that the privilege does not attach simply because a person hires a lawyer; the purpose of the retention must be for legal advice or representation. This ruling creates a precedent that attorneys cannot offer clients anonymity for actions that are merely ministerial, such as returning physical evidence, if those actions are divorced from any related legal counsel. The case serves as a warning to practitioners that their role as an 'agent' is distinct from their role as a 'legal advisor,' and the protections of the privilege do not extend to the former.
