Hughes v. Emerald Mines Corp.
303 Pa. Super. 426, 1982 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3965, 450 A.2d 1 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A party is liable for a private nuisance if their conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is both intentional and unreasonable. An invasion is intentional if the actor knows it is substantially certain to result from their conduct, and unreasonable if the resulting harm is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without compensation.
Facts:
- In 1953, the plaintiffs purchased a property, later drilling two wells which provided a continuous supply of potable water for many years.
- The defendant, a coal company, owned mining rights under and adjacent to the plaintiffs' land.
- In 1975, the defendant began expanding its mining operations onto the property contiguous to the plaintiffs' land.
- Between May 9 and May 29, 1978, the defendant drilled an airshaft (grout hole #4) approximately 540-600 feet from the plaintiffs' wells, injecting grout under pressure to seal off subterranean water flow.
- On May 31, 1978, the plaintiffs' first well went dry, and two or three days later, their second well became polluted.
- During this same period, several neighboring properties experienced similar problems with their water wells.
Procedural Posture:
- The landowners (plaintiffs) sued the coal company (defendant) in a Pennsylvania trial court for damages to their water wells.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them $32,500.
- The defendant coal company (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a mining company's grouting operation, which contaminates a landowner's water wells, constitute an intentional and unreasonable private nuisance when the company knows its actions are substantially certain to cause such harm?
Opinions:
Majority - Montemuro, J.
Yes. The mining company's conduct constitutes an intentional and unreasonable private nuisance. Applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822, the court found the invasion was 'intentional' under the 'substantial certainty' rule of § 825(b), as the company knew or should have known that its grouting process was substantially certain to seal off or pollute nearby water sources. The invasion was 'unreasonable' under § 829(a) because the harm—the loss of a potable water supply—was severe and greater than the plaintiffs should be required to bear without compensation, regardless of the utility of the mining operation. Once the plaintiff proved causation, the burden shifted to the defendant to show its conduct was not avoidable or only avoidable at prohibitive expense, a burden the defendant failed to meet. However, the court reversed the damages award, holding that the proper measure of damages is the cost of repair, not the diminution in property value, when repair is possible and significantly less expensive. Since evidence showed the wells could be restored for a fraction of the jury's $32,500 award, the case was remanded for a redetermination of damages based on the cost of remedy.
Dissenting - Price, J.
The opinion notes a dissent without providing any reasoning.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the Restatement's private nuisance framework, particularly the 'substantial certainty' standard for establishing intent in cases of non-trespassory invasion. It clarifies that a defendant cannot escape liability by arguing a lack of specific intent to harm if the harm was a virtually certain byproduct of their actions. The case also reinforces the principle that even a socially useful activity like mining can be deemed 'unreasonable' if it imposes severe, uncompensated harm on private landowners, shifting the burden of justification to the industrial actor. Finally, it provides a crucial lesson on damages, underscoring that courts will favor the lesser of two measures—cost of repair versus diminution in value—and will overturn a jury award that is not supported by evidence of the most economical remedy.
