Hughes v. Cristofane
486 F. Supp. 541 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance regulating non-obscene nude dancing in establishments serving alcohol is subject to a stricter standard of constitutional scrutiny than rational basis where the municipality lacks regulatory power under the Twenty-first Amendment. Such an ordinance may be preliminarily enjoined if it is likely to infringe on First Amendment rights and the balance of hardships tips in favor of the plaintiff.
Facts:
- The plaintiffs own and operate the Three Captains House of Seafood Restaurant in Bladensburg, Maryland.
- The restaurant provided entertainment in the form of 'topless' dancing.
- The Town of Bladensburg enacted Ordinance 3-80, which required an entertainment license and prohibited performers in establishments serving food or alcohol from displaying certain parts of the female breast, buttocks, or genitals.
- The ordinance also prohibited performers from coming within six feet of patrons.
- After the ordinance was enacted, police arrested three dancers employed by the plaintiffs and began visiting the restaurant daily.
- To comply with the ordinance, the plaintiffs instructed their dancers to wear halter tops.
- After complying, the restaurant's daily gross income dropped from over $1,000 to approximately $700, falling below the amount needed to cover daily operating expenses.
Procedural Posture:
- The owners and shareholders of the Three Captains House of Seafood Restaurant sued the mayor and town councilmen of Bladensburg in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.
- The plaintiffs brought the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the ordinance violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of the Bladensburg ordinance.
- After a hearing, the court granted the temporary restraining order.
- The case then proceeded to a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that prohibits non-obscene 'topless' dancing in any establishment serving food or alcoholic beverages likely violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, thereby warranting a preliminary injunction against its enforcement?
Opinions:
Majority - Murray, J.
Yes, the ordinance likely violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court granted the preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm and raised serious constitutional questions regarding the ordinance's validity. The court reasoned that non-obscene nude dancing is a form of expression entitled to some First Amendment protection. The town's reliance on California v. LaRue, which upheld broad state regulation of nude entertainment in bars, was misplaced because LaRue was grounded in the state's powers under the Twenty-first Amendment. Here, the Town of Bladensburg does not possess liquor licensing authority; that power is vested in a county board. In the absence of Twenty-first Amendment powers, the ordinance is subject to a stricter standard of scrutiny. The court also found the ordinance was likely unconstitutionally overbroad because its application to establishments serving only food could sweep in protected artistic performances, such as a play at a dinner theater. Finally, the ordinance raised equal protection concerns by discriminating between establishments that serve food or drink and those that do not, without a clear rational basis for the distinction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the broad power to regulate expressive conduct like nude dancing in establishments serving alcohol, as established in California v. LaRue, is directly tied to a governmental entity's regulatory authority under the Twenty-first Amendment. When a municipality lacks this specific authority, its regulations are subject to a more stringent First Amendment analysis. The case demonstrates that such ordinances may be challenged on overbreadth and equal protection grounds, especially if they are not narrowly tailored. It also serves as a key example of how the potential infringement of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm for the purposes of obtaining a preliminary injunction.
