Hufstetler v. State
63 So. 2d 730 (1953)
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Rule of Law:
Obtaining possession of property by fraud or trick with a contemporaneous intent to steal constitutes larceny if the owner intended to part only with possession of the property and not with its title.
Facts:
- Thomas R. Hufstetler drove a car with several other men to a service station owned by Porter Whorton.
- A passenger in the car asked Whorton to "fill it up" with gasoline.
- Whorton pumped 6.5 gallons of gasoline into the vehicle.
- The same passenger then asked Whorton for a quart of oil, creating a diversion.
- While Whorton went to get the oil, Hufstetler drove the car away with the others without paying for the gasoline.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas R. Hufstetler was charged with petit larceny in the trial court of Cherokee County, Alabama.
- Following a bench trial (trial by judge without a jury), the court found Hufstetler guilty of the charge.
- Hufstetler, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Alabama Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a person commit petit larceny when they obtain possession of gasoline by feigning an intent to purchase it, and then drive away without paying, when the owner did not intend to transfer title until payment was made?
Opinions:
Majority - Carr, P.J.
Yes, this conduct constitutes petit larceny. The critical distinction between larceny by trick and the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses lies in the intent of the victim. If the owner of the property intends to part only with possession, not title, and that possession is obtained through fraud with a concurrent intent to convert the property, the crime is larceny. In this case, the station owner, Whorton, intended to part with possession of the gasoline but did not intend to part with ownership (title) until he received payment. The defendant's fraudulent act of pretending to be a customer vitiated the owner's consent to the taking, meaning the defendant committed a trespassory taking sufficient for larceny.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinction between larceny by trick and obtaining property by false pretenses, establishing that the victim's intent is the determinative factor. It confirms that a transaction which appears consensual on the surface, such as a sale at a service station, can be deemed a trespassory taking if the consent was induced by fraud. This precedent solidifies the legal framework for prosecuting "gas-and-dash" scenarios as larceny, as it holds that title to the goods does not pass until the condition of payment is met. The decision reinforces the concept of constructive possession, where an owner is deemed to still possess property even after physically parting with it, if the transfer was based on trickery.
