Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
908 F.2d 1470, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 130, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 13151 (1990)
Rule of Law:
Under Colorado's comparative fault statute (§ 13-21-406 C.R.S.) applicable to strict product liability actions, the term "fault" encompasses ordinary negligence, allowing for a proportionate reduction in damages based on the plaintiff's responsibility. In diversity cases, federal law governs the recovery of costs, including expert witness fees, which are limited by federal statute unless a specific law or agreement provides otherwise. Additionally, Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures, applies only to measures taken after the plaintiff's accident or injury, not after the product's manufacture.
Facts:
- Garry Huffman was fatally injured on July 29, 1981, while operating a Caterpillar Model 561D pipelayer at the Steamboat Springs Ski Area, where he was employed by The Industrial Corporation (TIC).
- Huffman, who had only two weeks' experience on the 561D, was using the machine to adjust a large section of pipe on a steep 53% ski slope.
- The Model 561D pipelayer's braking system relied on a hydraulic boost, which substantially enhanced braking capacity only when the vehicle's engine was running.
- Huffman shut off the engine to hear a coworker's shouted instructions, causing the machine to begin rolling down the hill as the hydraulic braking assist was lost.
- Huffman was observed stomping on the brake pedals, but they were ineffective, and he subsequently rose from his seat, tried to climb off the accelerating vehicle, became tangled, and was crushed to death.
- Caterpillar had altered the braking system on successor models of the 561D beginning in 1981, adding a spring-applied emergency braking system that automatically stopped the pipelayer when the engine was shut off.
- The specific pipelayer Huffman was operating was manufactured in February 1981; spring-applied brakes for the Model 561D were designed between 1978 and 1980, and the first 561D pipelayers equipped with these brakes were manufactured in March 1981.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Susan Huffman initially filed a product liability action in the state District Court for Boulder County, Colorado.
- Caterpillar removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
- In the district court, Caterpillar filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the introduction of evidence of its subsequent remediation in the design of the 561D, which was denied.
- Caterpillar moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of strict liability, but these motions were denied.
- A jury found Caterpillar liable, assessing $950,000 in damages, which was then reduced to $475,000 to reflect the jury’s determination that the decedent had been 50 percent responsible for his own injuries.
- After judgment was entered for the plaintiff, Caterpillar filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which was denied.
- Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment was granted in part (increasing prejudgment interest) and denied in part (refusing the full $950,000 in assessed damages), resulting in an amended judgment of $475,000 in damages, interest, and $3,599.37 in costs.
- Plaintiff Huffman appealed the district court's interpretation of "fault" in the comparative fault statute and its limited award of costs.
- Defendant Caterpillar cross-appealed, challenging the denial of its motions for directed verdict/JNOV/new trial, the exclusion of co-worker testimony, and the admission of evidence regarding subsequent remediation.
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Issue:
1. Is "fault," as used in Colorado's comparative fault statute for strict product liability actions, broad enough to include ordinary negligence, thereby allowing a reduction in damages based on a plaintiff's responsibility? 2. Does federal law govern the recovery of expert witness fees as costs in diversity product liability actions, limiting them to federal statutory rates despite potentially conflicting state statutes? 3. Does Federal Rule of Evidence 407's exclusion of subsequent remedial measures apply to design changes implemented before the plaintiff's accident, or does the term "event" refer to the date of injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Holloway, Chief Judge
Yes, "fault" under Colorado's comparative fault statute for strict product liability actions includes ordinary negligence, and federal law governs the recovery of expert witness fees in diversity cases. No, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 does not apply to design changes implemented before the plaintiff's accident. The court affirmed the district court's interpretation of Colorado's comparative fault statute, § 13-21-406 C.R.S., holding that the term "fault" is a broad, general term encompassing a wide range of culpable behavior, including ordinary negligence. This conclusion was drawn from the plain language of the statute, legislative history showing the General Assembly's intent to create a hybrid system, and the common usage of the term "fault." Therefore, the jury's finding of 50% comparative fault by the decedent properly reduced the damage award. The court further held that in diversity cases, federal law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) and Crawford Fitting v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., controls the assessment of costs, including expert witness fees. Colorado's statute § 13-33-102(4) does not authorize expert witness fees as costs beyond the federal statutory limit of $30 per day, absent explicit authorization or agreement. Consequently, the district court's limited award of costs was affirmed. Regarding Caterpillar's cross-appeal, the court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of strict product liability. Evidence supported that the 561D was unreasonably dangerous under the consumer expectation test (e.g., brake pedal placement, unexpected hazard of rolling with engine off, absence of feasible spring-applied brakes), that defects caused the accident, and that warnings were inadequate. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding co-worker testimony as hearsay or irrelevant. Finally, concerning the admission of evidence about subsequent design changes, the court clarified that Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence applies only to remedial measures taken after the "event," which it defined as the accident or injury to the plaintiff, not the time of manufacture. Since Caterpillar's design change to add spring-applied brakes occurred before Huffman's fatal accident (designed 1978-1980, first 561D models with them in March 1981, accident in July 1981), the evidence was not subject to exclusion under Rule 407. Thus, the district court's admission of this evidence was not error.
Analysis:
This case significantly impacts product liability law by clarifying that Colorado's comparative fault statute embraces a broad definition of "fault," encompassing a plaintiff's ordinary negligence. This represents a hybrid approach, allowing for damage reduction even in strict liability cases, which historically minimized plaintiff conduct. The ruling reinforces the supremacy of federal law in determining recoverable litigation costs in diversity actions, preventing plaintiffs from utilizing more generous state statutes for expert witness fees. Most critically, the opinion provides a definitive interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 407, holding that the "event" triggering its exclusion of subsequent remedial measures refers to the actual accident or injury, not the product's manufacturing date, thereby allowing evidence of safety improvements made prior to an accident.
