Guy C. Hudson, a Minor, etc., et al. v. Orville Craft et al.
33 Cal. 2d 654 (1949)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A promoter who conducts an illegal and unlicensed boxing match in violation of state safety regulations is civilly liable for injuries sustained by a participant, because the state's strong public policy of protecting that class of persons invalidates the participant's consent.
Facts:
- Defendants conducted a carnival which included a boxing exhibition concession.
- The boxing concession charged a separate admission fee and offered prize money to contestants.
- The concession was operated without a license from the State Athletic Commission and was not conducted in accordance with its rules.
- Defendants solicited the plaintiff, an 18-year-old, to participate in a boxing match with the promise of receiving $5.00.
- The plaintiff accepted the offer, engaged in the boxing match, and suffered personal injuries after being struck by his opponent.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff sued the defendants in a California trial court.
- Defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing it failed to state a valid cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer but granted the plaintiff leave to amend their complaint.
- The plaintiff chose not to amend the complaint.
- The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiff, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of California.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a participant's consent to engage in an illegal and unlicensed boxing match bar their civil claim for injuries against the match's promoter?
Opinions:
Majority - Carter, J.
No. A participant's consent does not bar a claim for injuries against the promoter of an illegal and unlicensed boxing match. California has an unusually strong public policy, expressed through its Constitution, statutes, and athletic commission regulations, to control boxing and protect participants from harm. This policy is primarily aimed at protecting combatants, especially minors, from their own ill-advised participation in unregulated matches. Where a safety statute is designed to protect a specific class of people, the consent of a member of that class cannot be used as a defense by the party who violated the statute, particularly the promoter who is the 'activating force' behind the illegal event. Therefore, the doctrine of pari delicto (in equal fault) does not apply, and the promoter is liable for injuries caused by the illegal fight.
Concurring - Edmonds, J.
No. While I agree the promoter is liable, the proper legal basis is the employer-employee relationship. The facts show the plaintiff was an employee of the defendants for the single event. An employer has a duty to provide safe working conditions, which the defendants breached by conducting an illegal and unregulated boxing match. While most workplace injuries are handled by workers' compensation, that system does not apply here because the employment contract itself was illegal, as it required the employee to commit a crime (participating in an illegal prize fight). Therefore, the plaintiff can sue the employer directly in tort for breaching the duty to provide a safe workplace.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant public policy exception to the general tort law principle that consent is a valid defense to battery. It establishes that when a statute or comprehensive regulatory scheme is designed to protect a particular class of individuals from their own poor judgment, a person's consent to engage in the prohibited activity is ineffective. This holding strengthens the concept of negligence per se, where violating a safety statute can lead to civil liability, and suggests a promoter's liability can approach strict liability in cases of unregulated, dangerous activities. The ruling puts the onus on promoters to comply with safety regulations, making it clear they cannot escape liability by arguing that the injured party 'knew the risks.'
