Huddleston by and Through Lynch v. Hughes
1992 WL 354893, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 236, 843 S.W.2d 901 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A landowner's immunity from liability under a state's Recreational Use Statute may be negated under the 'willful or malicious' failure to warn exception if the landowner, aware of a recurring dangerous condition on the property, repeatedly fails to take meaningful corrective action, thereby demonstrating an entire absence of care or great indifference to the safety of others.
Facts:
- The Diocese of Covington, under Bishop Hughes, owned a playground/parking lot at Covington Latin School that was accessible to the public.
- The playground contained two free-standing basketball goals that were not cemented to the pavement.
- To prevent the goals from tipping, the Bishop's employees placed large concrete pieces at the base of each goal as counterweights.
- School employees were aware that neighborhood children frequently entered the property to play and would remove the concrete counterweights to lower the rim for 'slam-dunking'.
- The specific basketball goal that injured Steven Huddleston was known by school employees to have fallen on multiple prior occasions.
- Each time the goal fell, school employees would set it back upright without employing additional permanent safety measures, such as cementing it to the ground or using a chain.
- On June 16, 1988, Steven Huddleston and his friends removed the concrete counterweights from a goal, which subsequently fell on Huddleston from behind and broke his back.
- On the day of the incident, the goal was not secured by a chain.
Procedural Posture:
- Steven Huddleston and his mother sued Bishop Hughes in a Kentucky trial court, alleging premises liability and attractive nuisance.
- Bishop Hughes filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing for immunity under Kentucky's Recreational Use Statute (KRS 411.190).
- The trial court granted Bishop Hughes's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Huddleston's lawsuit.
- Huddleston filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied.
- Huddleston, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a landowner's repeated failure to permanently secure a free-standing basketball goal, which they knew had fallen multiple times and was frequently tampered with by children, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether their conduct constitutes a 'willful or malicious' failure to guard or warn under Kentucky's Recreational Use Statute, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Huddleston, J.
Yes. A landowner's repeated failure to remedy a known, recurring hazard can constitute a 'willful or malicious' failure to guard or warn, creating a jury question that defeats summary judgment. The court agreed that the Recreational Use Statute (KRS 411.190) applied because the Diocese implicitly permitted the public to use its land. However, the statute's immunity is not absolute and contains an exception for 'willful or malicious failure to guard or warn.' The court held that 'willful or malicious' does not require a deliberate intent to injure, but can be established by conduct showing 'an entire absence of care for the life, person, or property of others which exhibits indifference to consequences.' The uncontradicted evidence showed the school knew the goal was unstable, knew children tampered with it, and knew it had fallen repeatedly. By continually re-setting the goal without taking further precautions, a reasonable jury could conclude the school acted with great indifference to the safety of people like Huddleston, thus creating a triable issue of fact.
Concurring - Gudgel, J.
Yes. While agreeing that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the concurring opinion argues the majority used the wrong legal definition for 'willful'. The proper standard should come from the precedent set in Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., which defines 'willful' conduct as 'an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.' Judge Gudgel contends that the trial should be limited to this specific definition of 'willful' conduct. Furthermore, he argues that the words 'willful' and 'malicious' are mutually exclusive in the statute, and since there is no evidence of malicious (i.e., evil) intent, the jury should not be instructed on malice at all.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the 'willful or malicious' exception within Kentucky's Recreational Use Statute, lowering the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs seeking to overcome the statute's grant of immunity to landowners. By defining 'willful' conduct to include not just intentional acts but also acts of gross indifference to known dangers, the court broadens potential landowner liability. The ruling establishes that a pattern of inaction in the face of a known, recurring hazard can be sufficient to send a case to a jury. This puts landowners on notice that they cannot passively allow dangerous conditions to persist on property open to the public for recreation, even if they charge no fee for access.
