Hubbard v. Commonwealth
202 S.W. 2d 634 (1947)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Criminal liability for homicide does not attach when a death results from an indirect, unlawful act unless the death was a probable and natural consequence of that act; if the act is too remote a cause, there is no culpability.
Facts:
- Robert Hubbard, while on furlough from the army, was arrested for being drunk in a public place.
- At the courthouse, Hubbard was deemed too drunk to be tried and was ordered to jail.
- Hubbard refused to comply and began to physically resist being taken to jail.
- R.W. Dyche, the jailer, and a deputy attempted to subdue Hubbard, leading to a scuffle.
- During the struggle, Hubbard struck the deputy but never made physical contact with Dyche.
- Dyche, who had a known serious heart condition, became over-exerted and stated he could not continue.
- Shortly after the scuffle ended, Dyche sat down, clutched his heart, collapsed, and died of a heart attack within thirty minutes.
- Medical testimony confirmed Dyche's death was from acute dilatation of the heart, and that the physical exertion and excitement likely accelerated it.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Hubbard was charged with voluntary manslaughter for the death of R.W. Dyche.
- The case was tried in Jackson County after a change of venue.
- A trial court convicted Hubbard of the charge and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment.
- Hubbard appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a defendant's unlawful act of resisting arrest, which causes excitement and exertion leading to a fatal heart attack in an officer with a severe pre-existing heart condition, constitute culpable homicide when the defendant never physically struck the officer?
Opinions:
Majority - Stanley, Commissioner
No. A defendant's unlawful act does not constitute culpable homicide where the death was not a probable and natural consequence of the act. For criminal liability to be imposed for a death caused by an indirect act, such as inducing fright or exertion, the death must be a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct. Here, Hubbard's misdemeanor of resisting arrest was too remote a cause of Dyche's death. The court reasoned that the direct cause of death was Dyche's pre-existing, diseased heart, not Hubbard's actions. The court also noted potential intervening causes, including Dyche's own decision to engage in the struggle despite knowing of his condition and his subsequent actions after the scuffle. Citing Commonwealth v. Couch, the court held that it would be speculative to find Hubbard's actions were sufficiently proximate to impose criminal responsibility for the unfortunate death.
Analysis:
This case refines the doctrine of proximate cause in criminal homicide by establishing a stricter standard for indirect causation. The court distinguishes between deaths resulting from direct physical injury and those resulting from secondary effects like fright or exertion, particularly when a pre-existing condition is involved. The decision narrows the scope of involuntary manslaughter, requiring that the death be not just a 'but-for' result of a misdemeanor, but its 'probable and natural consequence.' This precedent makes it more difficult for prosecutors to secure homicide convictions in cases where a victim with an underlying vulnerability dies from stress or exertion caused by a defendant's non-violent or indirectly harmful unlawful act.
Unlock the full brief for Hubbard v. Commonwealth