Houston Transit Co. v. Felder
146 Tex. 428, 1948 Tex. LEXIS 362, 208 S.W.2d 880 (1948)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is liable for the willful and malicious acts of an employee when those acts are so closely connected with the performance of the employee's duties that they are treated as one indivisible tort, for which the employer is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Facts:
- A car driven by Guy Felder collided with the rear of a Houston Transit Company bus.
- The bus driver, B. F. Goodson, was required by his job to investigate accidents and gather information from the other party involved.
- Goodson exited his bus and approached Felder's car to obtain information for his employer.
- While Goodson was engaged in this duty and before he had finished his mission, an altercation occurred between the two men.
- During this altercation, Goodson struck Felder in the face with a metal money-changing box, causing injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Guy Felder sued the Houston Transit Company in a district court in Harris County (trial court) for damages.
- A jury found that the company's driver was acting within the scope of his employment and awarded Felder $1,000.
- The trial court judge set aside the verdict and entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the Houston Transit Company.
- Felder, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered a judgment in favor of Felder.
- The Houston Transit Company, as appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does an employee's intentional assault on a third party fall within the scope of employment when it is closely connected to and immediately grows out of the performance of the employee's authorized duties?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Simpson
Yes. An employee's intentional assault falls within the scope of employment when the act is so closely connected to the performance of the employee's duties as to prevent the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the employee had ceased acting as an agent. The court reasoned that it was undisputed that Goodson was performing his duty to get information when the assault occurred. The assault was not a separate, personal act but was so intertwined with his employment mission that it became part of a single, indivisible tort. The court adopted the rule from Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cobb, stating that a master is liable for an act of the servant which is connected with and immediately grows out of another act of the servant that is imputable to the master. Whether the assault was motivated solely by personal resentment or was part of the job-related confrontation was a question of fact for the jury, which found it to be within the scope of employment.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that an employer's liability for an employee's intentional torts is not automatically severed just because the act was willful or malicious. It broadens the scope of 'respondeat superior' by focusing on the nexus between the employee's duties and the wrongful act. The ruling makes it more difficult for employers to escape liability by arguing the employee was on a 'detour or frolic,' instead shifting the determination of the employee's motive and connection to their work to the jury as a question of fact. This precedent increases the likelihood of employer liability for assaults committed by employees in confrontational, customer-facing roles.
