Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis
140 A.L.R. 868, 161 S.W. 2d 474, 139 Tex. 1 (1942)
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Rule of Law:
A spontaneous statement made by a declarant describing or explaining an event as it is being perceived is admissible as a present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Separately, a parent with a legal duty to support a minor child is a necessary party to a suit for damages brought on the minor's behalf unless pleadings and proof show why that parent's participation is not required.
Facts:
- Pearl Davis's minor son, Charles Applebhy, was a passenger in a Plymouth car.
- A car driven by Mrs. Sally Cooper was traveling in the same direction on the same highway.
- The Plymouth car passed Mrs. Cooper's car at a high rate of speed, estimated at 60-65 mph, on a rough and uneven curve.
- As the Plymouth passed, Mrs. Cooper stated to her passengers, "they must have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that rate of speed up."
- Approximately four or five miles down the road and ten to fifteen minutes later, the Plymouth was involved in a collision with a truck owned by Houston Oxygen Company, Inc., and driven by Oliver O. Stanbury.
- Charles Applebhy was injured in the collision.
- Charles Applebhy's father and mother, Pearl Davis, were divorced, and the father, who lived in Abilene, was not included as a party in the lawsuit.
Procedural Posture:
- Pearl Davis, on behalf of herself and as next friend for her minor son, Charles Applebhy, sued Houston Oxygen Company, Inc., and its driver, Oliver O. Stanbury, in a Texas trial court for personal injury damages.
- The defendants filed a cross-action for contribution against Sidney Lewis, the driver of the car in which the minor was a passenger.
- During the trial, the court ruled that testimony regarding a statement made by witness Mrs. Sally Cooper just before the accident was inadmissible hearsay.
- A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the trial court entered a judgment awarding damages to both the mother and the minor son.
- The defendants appealed the judgment to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the minor's father was not a necessary party and that the exclusion of Mrs. Cooper's statement was proper.
- The defendants, Houston Oxygen Co. and Stanbury, then sought and were granted a writ of error to appeal to the Commission of Appeals of Texas.
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Issue:
Is a bystander's statement describing a car as speeding and predicting it would wreck, made minutes before the car was involved in a collision, admissible as a spontaneous declaration exception to the rule against hearsay?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Judge Taylor
Yes. A spontaneous statement made concurrently with observing an event is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The court reasoned that Mrs. Cooper's statement was a present sense impression, a type of spontaneous declaration. Unlike an excited utterance, a present sense impression does not require a startling event. Its reliability comes from other safeguards: (1) the statement is made at the moment of the perception, eliminating defects of memory; (2) there is little or no time for calculated misstatement; and (3) it is usually made to another witness who has an equal opportunity to observe and check the statement. The court found the statement was not too remote in time to be relevant to the accident's cause and that its admissibility was a matter of law, not judicial discretion. The court also held that the minor's father was a necessary party to the suit because, as a parent with a legal duty of support, he has a correlative right to the minor's services and potential recovery. The plaintiffs failed to plead any facts, such as abandonment or a specific divorce decree provision, that would negate the father's interest.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and broadens the scope of the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule in Texas, specifically endorsing the reliability of the "present sense impression." The decision establishes that a statement need not be prompted by a shocking or startling event to be admissible, so long as it is made contemporaneously with the observation it describes. This precedent lowers the bar for admitting bystander statements made in the moments leading up to an accident, shifting the focus from the declarant's emotional state to the timing of the statement itself. The ruling provides attorneys with a clearer path to introduce evidence of observations made just before an event, which can be crucial in establishing negligence.
