Houston Estate
414 Pa. 579, 1964 Pa. LEXIS 600, 201 A.2d 592 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
A remainder interest is construed as vested unless a clear and plain intention to create a contingent interest is expressed in the will. A gift to a class, such as 'grandchildren,' followed by a clause providing for the children of a deceased member, creates a vested remainder subject to divestment only in the specific circumstance articulated, not a remainder contingent on survival of the life tenant.
Facts:
- On February 2, 1892, Henry H. Houston executed a will creating a trust.
- The will provided that income from the trust would be paid to his wife and three children for their respective lives.
- The will directed that upon the death of his last surviving child, the trust principal was to be 'distributed in equal portions to and among my grand-children, the children of any deceased grand-child taking their deceased parents share.'
- Henry H. Houston died on June 21, 1895, and was survived by his wife, three children, and six grandchildren. Six additional grandchildren were born after his death.
- The testator’s last surviving child, Gertrude Houston Woodward, died on October 2, 1961, triggering the distribution of the trust principal.
- At the time of the last child's death, eight grandchildren were living.
- Four grandchildren had predeceased the last surviving child: one left children, while three others died unmarried and without any children.
Procedural Posture:
- This case arose from the audit of the trustees' account in the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County.
- The Orphans' Court held that the grandchildren's remainder interests were vested and awarded the principal of the trust in 12 equal shares.
- Certain parties, including living grandchildren and great-grandchildren (appellants), appealed the decree of the Orphans' Court to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does a testamentary gift of trust principal to be distributed 'in equal portions to and among my grand-children, the children of any deceased grand-child taking their deceased parents share' upon the death of the last life tenant create a contingent remainder that requires a grandchild to survive the life tenant to take?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Bell
No. The testamentary gift creates a vested remainder in the grandchildren at the testator's death, or upon their birth, subject to divestment only in the specific instance that a grandchild predeceases the final life tenant and leaves children. The court's primary duty is to ascertain the testator's intent from the four corners of the will. The language gifting the principal 'in equal portions to and among my grand-children' is an absolute gift, creating a vested interest. The subsequent clause, 'the children of any deceased grand-child taking their deceased parents share,' operates as a condition subsequent, divesting the interest of a deceased grandchild only if that grandchild left children. The testator repeatedly used explicit language of survivorship in other parts of the will, demonstrating he knew how to create contingent gifts when he so intended. His failure to use such language for the principal gift indicates an intent to create a vested interest. The law presumes an interest is vested rather than contingent, and any intent to the contrary must be stated clearly and plainly, which was not done here.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Roberts
Yes. The gift of the trust principal should be construed as contingent upon the grandchildren surviving the last life tenant. The testator's clear intent, gleaned from his personal experiences with children predeceasing him and his constant reference to living persons throughout the will, was to benefit his living descendants, not the estates of those long dead. The majority's construction leads to the 'highly improbable result' of passing a substantial portion of the estate to strangers of the testator's bloodline through the estates of deceased grandchildren. The phrase 'the children of any deceased grand-child taking deceased parents share' implies that survivorship is required, as it provides a substitute gift only for those deceased grandchildren who left children, suggesting those who died without children were not intended beneficiaries. The presumption of vesting is a rule of construction that should not be applied rigidly to defeat the testator's plausible intent.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the strong preference in Pennsylvania jurisprudence for vested over contingent remainders, establishing that an intent to require survival must be stated explicitly and will not be implied. It serves as a critical lesson for estate planners on the necessity of using unambiguous language of survivorship (e.g., 'to my then-living grandchildren') if that is the client's intent. The court's refusal to rewrite the will despite acknowledging the 'regretful' consequences, including massive tax liabilities and distribution to non-family members, underscores its commitment to a strict textualist interpretation of testamentary documents. The opinion also formally overrules a prior inconsistent case, Rosengarten v. Ashton, thereby clarifying the state's law on this issue.
