Hospodar v. Schick
2005 Pa. Super. 319, 885 A.2d 986, 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3441 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A physician does not owe a legal duty to a third party injured by a patient for failing to report that patient's medically-impaired driving fitness to the state's transportation department, as the relevant statute does not create a private cause of action.
Facts:
- On December 21, 1998, Jack Smith was in an automobile accident after allegedly "blacking out" and was subsequently seen by a doctor at Pittsburgh Neurology Associates (PNA), who was informed of Smith's prior seizure history.
- PNA's agents did not treat Smith for seizures or suggest he restrict his driving.
- On April 11, 2000, Smith had another motor vehicle accident where he claimed to have "blacked out," and he admitted to hospital staff that he had a previously diagnosed seizure disorder.
- On May 3, 2000, Smith was seen by Dr. Mark E. Hospodar of PNA, who was aware of Smith's two prior "black out" accidents, his history of a possible seizure disorder, and the fact that Smith had lost his license after the second accident.
- Dr. Hospodar failed to diagnose or treat Smith for a seizure disorder.
- Dr. Hospodar completed a PennDOT medical form about Smith, answering "I do not know" to the question of Smith's medical competence to drive.
- Later that month, Dr. Hospodar orally advised PennDOT representatives that it was safe for Smith to operate a motor vehicle.
- On October 18, 2000, Smith experienced another "black out" while driving, causing a high-speed collision that killed Patricia A. Schick and Sherry A. Zeis.
Procedural Posture:
- The estates of Patricia A. Schick and Sherry A. Zeis filed separate medical malpractice actions against Dr. Mark E. Hospodar and Pittsburgh Neurology Associates, Ltd. in the trial court.
- The two cases were subsequently consolidated by court order.
- Dr. Hospodar and Pittsburgh Neurology Associates, Ltd. (Appellants) filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing they owed no legal duty to the decedents.
- The trial court denied the Appellants' preliminary objections.
- The trial court certified the order for interlocutory appeal, identifying it as involving a controlling question of law.
- The Superior Court of Pennsylvania (an intermediate appellate court) granted review of the trial court's order.
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Issue:
Does a physician owe a legal duty to third parties who are killed by a patient-driver for negligently failing to diagnose the patient's seizure disorder and report the patient's unfitness to drive to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT)?
Opinions:
Majority - Del Sole, P.J.
No. A physician does not owe a duty to a third party injured by a patient because the physician failed to report the patient's condition to PennDOT. The court found this case to be analogous to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, which held that the Motor Vehicle Code's reporting requirements do not create a private cause of action for third parties against a physician. The court distinguished this case from DiMarco v. Lynch Homes, which found a physician's duty extended to third parties in cases of communicable disease, by reasoning that the same duty does not extend to non-communicable conditions. Furthermore, as in Witthoeft, the patient, Jack Smith, was aware of his own seizure disorder and his history of blacking out while driving, placing him in the best position to know the risk.
Dissenting - Tamilia, J.
Yes. A physician should be held liable in this situation where they were aware of a patient's documented history of seizures and prior accidents caused by that condition, yet failed to properly diagnose, treat, or report the condition to PennDOT. The dissent argues this case is factually distinguishable from Witthoeft, where there was no allegation of prior accidents caused by the patient's poor vision. Instead, the facts are more analogous to DiMarco and Goryeb, where a duty was found to exist to protect those within a foreseeable orbit of risk. It was entirely foreseeable to Dr. Hospodar that his failure to act would create a substantial risk of harm to other motorists.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the narrow interpretation of a physician's duty to third parties in Pennsylvania, as established by Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon. It solidifies the legal distinction between a physician's duty regarding communicable diseases, which may extend to foreseeable third parties, and their statutory reporting obligations for conditions that impair driving, which do not create a private right of action for victims. The ruling emphasizes that a patient's own knowledge of their dangerous condition is a critical factor in limiting a physician's liability. Consequently, future plaintiffs seeking to hold physicians liable for injuries caused by patients will face a high bar, needing to demonstrate facts that clearly distinguish their case from the precedent set in Witthoeft.
