Holodook v. Spencer
324 N.E.2d 338, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A child does not have a legally cognizable cause of action against a parent for negligent supervision. Consequently, a third-party tortfeasor cannot seek contribution from a parent on the basis of negligent supervision.
Facts:
- In Graney v. Graney, a four-year-old child fell from a high slide in a school playground while accompanied by his father, who allegedly allowed the child to stray from his immediate control.
- In Ryan v. Fahey, a three-year-old child's hand was run over by a riding lawnmower operated by an eight-year-old neighbor in the neighbor's backyard.
- The mothers of both the Ryan child and the neighbor child were inside the neighbor's house at the time of the lawnmower incident.
- In Holodook v. Spencer, a four-year-old child, who was in his mother's custody, darted out from between parked cars and was struck by an automobile driven by defendant Spencer.
Procedural Posture:
- In Graney, the infant plaintiff sued his father in the trial court (Special Term). The court granted the father's motion to dismiss. The intermediate appellate court (Appellate Division) affirmed.
- In Ryan, the infant plaintiff sued his mother and neighbors. The mother moved to dismiss the complaint against her. The trial court (Special Term) denied the motion. The intermediate appellate court (Appellate Division) reversed and granted the motion to dismiss.
- In Holodook, the infant plaintiff sued the driver, Spencer. Spencer filed a third-party complaint and counterclaim against the infant's parents for contribution. The parents moved to dismiss. The trial court (Special Term) denied the motion. The intermediate appellate court (Appellate Division) reversed and granted the motion to dismiss.
- The plaintiffs in Graney and Ryan, and the third-party plaintiff in Holodook, appealed the respective decisions of the Appellate Divisions to the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a parent's failure to adequately supervise their child constitute a tort actionable by the child, for which a third party may seek contribution?
Opinions:
Majority - Rabin, J.
No. A parent’s failure to adequately supervise a child is not a legally recognized tort actionable by the child. The abrogation of intrafamilial immunity in Gelbman v. Gelbman did not create new liabilities within the family, but merely removed a procedural bar to claims for breach of duties owed to the world at large, such as the duty to drive carefully. The duty of supervision, by contrast, is a core parental function that arises solely from the family relationship. Recognizing this as a tort would subject parents to litigation for nearly any childhood accident and would be contrary to public policy for several reasons. First, it would undermine the legislative policy of General Obligations Law § 3-111, which prohibits imputing a parent's negligence to a child, as allowing contribution from a parent would effectively diminish the child's recovery. Second, it would create family discord and could deter uninsured parents from seeking recovery for their injured children against negligent third parties. Finally, establishing a reasonable standard of parental supervision for courts and juries to apply is unworkable, as parenting involves a wide range of discretionary judgments based on love and instinct, not legal standards.
Dissenting - Jasen, J.
Yes. A parent's failure to adequately supervise their child should be an actionable tort. The parental duty to supervise was recognized in early New York law, and the abrogation of intrafamilial immunity in Gelbman should permit claims for its breach. The policy justifications for denying the claim—such as preserving family harmony and avoiding collusion—were rejected in Gelbman. Juries are capable of determining a 'reasonable and prudent parent' standard, just as they determine reasonableness in other areas of tort law. Furthermore, the principles of fairness established in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. demand that a parent whose negligence contributed to a child's injury should share in the liability, rather than forcing a third-party tortfeasor to bear the entire loss.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant exception to the abrogation of intrafamilial immunity, establishing the doctrine of parental immunity for negligent supervision. While Gelbman allowed children to sue parents for ordinary negligence (e.g., in a car accident), Holodook holds that parents cannot be sued for conduct that is core to the parental role. This prevents third-party tortfeasors from shifting liability to parents in cases involving injured children, reinforcing the policy that a parent's negligence should not diminish a child's recovery. The case solidifies a distinction between a parent's duties owed to the world at large (which are actionable by a child) and unique parental duties (which are not).
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